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The attitude of Russia toward the evolving political environment in the Western 
Pacific plays an important role in an increasingly volatile region. President Vladimir 
Putin appears determined to make the Russian Federation a prominent actor in the region 
through the assertion of Russian naval power, and by forming an alliance of convenience 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to minimize U.S. influence in the region. 
However, current attempts by the Russian Federation to assert its influence in the 
Western Pacific region through naval power are destined to fail.  
The region is a vast area running from the Strait of Malacca in the south to Siberia 
in the north. The leadership of the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin is 
nevertheless eager to utilize its navy as leverage to extend its influence in the Western 
Pacific through at least four means: First, through SSBN strategic nuclear deployments. 
Second, by increasing the Russian Federation’s visibility through port visits, participation 
in peacekeeping and multilateral operations, and through joint maneuvers with other 
countries such as India, Vietnam and China. Third, through the sale of high technology 
naval weapons systems, specifically the Sovremennyy class guided missile destroyers, 
Krivak-class frigates and Kilo-class submarines. Finally, by utilizing naval power to 
leverage better relations and possible alliances with U.S. adversaries in the region to 
counter a dominant U.S. influence. Increasing tensions between the PRC and the United 
States in the Western Pacific over Taiwan and the South China Sea have presented 
Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opportunity to develop common cause with the 
Chinese government to thwart U.S. power in the region. President Putin has allegedly 
promised Beijing that the Russian Pacific Fleet will intervene against the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet during a potential conflict between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC).  
However, none of these programs is living up to its potential due to a lack of means. 
Therefore, Moscow’s ambition to assert its influence in the Western Pacific 
region will ultimately fail. Numerous reasons explain the inability of the Russian Navy to 
influence events in the Western Pacific region. First, historically Russia has proven 
unable to sustain a naval build-up since Peter the Great founded the Russian Navy in 
 xvii
1697. Second, Russia is a continental power that lacks the assets and interests for 
sustained maritime power projection. The Russian Army, not the navy, has decided the 
outcome of every major war that Russia has been involved in. Third, Russia’s major 
interests lie in Europe. The Russian Federation has limited common interests with the 
countries of the Western Pacific region beyond a residual anti-Americanism. NATO 
remains the primary concern for Russia’s military commanders, not countries in the Far 
East. Finally, Moscow’s reliance on arms sales only provides short-term leverage in the 
projection of international influence. Many of the advances Russia enjoys today 
regarding high-tech weapons will diminish rapidly without proper research and 
development. Inevitably it is an absence of fundamental Russian interests in the Western 
Pacific region, combined with the inadequacy of Russian naval power, which ensures 
Russian attempts to assert influence in the region will fail. 
 xviii
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. DESCRIPTION  
This thesis will argue that the current attempts by the Russian Federation to assert 
its influence in the Western Pacific region through naval power is destined to fail for four 
reasons: First, historically Russia has proven unable to sustain a naval build-up. The 
country’s political, economic and social structure is too fragile to mount a sustained naval 
armaments program. Russia is a continental power that lacks the assets and interests for 
sustained maritime power projection. Second, Russia’s major interests lie in Europe. 
Historically, when forced to choose between its European and its Pacific interests, Russia 
invariably chooses Europe. This was the case in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, 
and in two World Wars. Moscow’s primary security concerns today are NATO expansion 
and the Islamic inspired terrorist threat in the south. The expansion of the Western Pacific 
will do nothing to resolve either issue. Third, the Russian Federation has limited common 
interests with the countries of the Western Pacific region beyond residual anti-
Americanism. China’s sense of isolation is being exploited by Moscow as a vehicle to 
assert strategic leverage with the United States. Fundamentally, Moscow shares few 
common interests with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) beyond a common fear of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Moscow has no fundamental interests in the 
future of Taiwan, the issue seen by Beijing as its most important priority. Europe has 
always been the primary focus for Russia and it is where its major interests lie. Fourth, 
arms sales provide only short-term leverage in the projection of international influence. 
Current advantages in the areas of naval technology held by the Russian Federation will 
diminish as the systems sold to India and the PRC are reverse engineered, and new 
systems introduced.    
This topic is relevant and important because the future of Russian influence in the 
region has a direct impact for the U.S. Navy and U.S. national security. The Russian 
Federation inherited an immense industrial complex, as well as, a capable and powerful 
naval force in the Soviet Pacific Fleet from its Soviet predecessor. However, the end of 
the Cold War has witnessed the diminished power of many of the institutions of the 
former Soviet Union. Among them, the under-funded Russian Navy is but a shadow of its 
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Soviet predecessor. The leadership of the Russian Federation under President Vladimir 
Putin is nevertheless eager to utilize its navy as leverage to extend its influence in the 
Western Pacific in at least four ways: 
1. Through SSBN strategic nuclear deployments. 
2. By increasing the Russian Federation’s visibility through port visits, 
participation in peacekeeping and multilateral operations, and through 
joint maneuvers with other countries such as India, Vietnam and 
China. 
3. Through the sale of high technology naval weapons systems, 
specifically the Sovremennyy class guided missile destroyers, Krivak-
class frigates and Kilo-class submarines.  
4. By utilizing naval power to leverage better relations and possible 
alliances with U.S. adversaries in the region to counter a dominant 
U.S. influence. Increasing tensions between the PRC and the United 
States in the Western Pacific over Taiwan and the South China Sea 
have presented Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opportunity 
to make common cause with the Chinese government to thwart U.S. 
power. President Putin has allegedly promised Beijing that the Russian 
Pacific Fleet will intervene against the U.S. Seventh Fleet during a 
potential conflict between the PRC and the ROC.1  
The United States is uniquely positioned to influence, through naval forward 
presence, the Western Pacific region. The region has a complex geographical, economic 
and political environment, which will be difficult for any country to manage. The region 
is a vast area running from the Strait of Malacca in the south to Siberia in the north. It 
offers blue-water and littoral environments, in which the U.S. Navy has learned to 
operate effectively. 
                                                 
1 “Russian Fleet Will Intercept U.S. 7th Fleet’s Intervention in Cross-Strait War,” Hong Kong Sing Tao 
Jih Pao, 8 July 2000, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 8 July 2000, 
CPP 20000708000004. 
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The Western Pacific region is growing economically and the United States has 
significant economic interests there. Primary U.S. trade occurs within the region, in 
particular with Japan and with an increasingly economically powerful China. However, 
the region is politically volatile. Increasing economic, political and military assertiveness 
by the PRC threatens to unsettle stable relationships the United States has built up in the 
region since the end of World War II, relationships that have been cemented in large part 
through naval forward presence. The changing political situation in the region is 
important to the U.S. Navy. Before the events of 11 September 2001, the George W. 
Bush administration appeared to be focusing U.S. diplomatic and military assets toward 
the Western Pacific. And while that strategic redeployment has been temporarily 
interrupted by the “War on Terrorism” and the attacks on Afghanistan, one may assume 
that once those issues are resolved, Washington’s primary focus will once again settle on 
the Western Pacific. Of particular concern to Washington is a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue. However, the United States must also solidify its relationship with Japan 
and South Korea.       
The attitude of Russia toward the evolving political environment in the Western 
Pacific plays an important role in an increasingly volatile region. President Putin appears 
determined to make the Russian Federation a prominent actor in the region through the 
assertion of Russian naval power, and by forming an alliance of convenience with the 
PRC to minimize U.S. influence in the region. This Thesis will argue that an absence of 
fundamental Russian interests in the Western Pacific combined with the inadequacy of 




The research for this thesis will come from a variety of primary and some 
secondary sources. It will use the history of United States, PRC and Soviet activities in 
the Western Pacific Region as a guide for future developments there. Additionally, the 
thesis will make use of books, scholarly articles, web sites, and official reports as 
research sources about the evolving political climate in the region, as well as the 
technological capabilities of Russian naval forces. 
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 C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II offers a historical overview of Russian attempts at naval power 
projection since Peter the Great. At various times in its history, Russian leaders have 
endeavored to increase Russia/Soviet Union’s world standing through an increased naval 
presence. The chapter will specifically focus on three pivotal periods in the history of 
Russian naval development: First, the period of Peter the Great, “The Father of the 
Russian Navy” and his direct descendants.  Second, the turn of the 19th and 20th century 
with a final culmination at the Battle of Tsushima. Finally, the Soviet naval build-up 
spearheaded by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in the 1970s and 1980s. It will argue that prior 
reform attempts failed for various reasons. First, Russia must contend with a limited 
number of suitable outlets to the sea. Second, Russia lacks the necessary resources to be 
both a sea and a land power. Third, the lack of political stability required to sustain the 
build-up of a powerful navy has never been achieved. Finally, Russia is a European 
power, one that lacks the resources to project power into the Pacific region. Prior 
attempts at increasing naval presence in the Western Pacific region have invariably failed 
over time. When Russia is required to choose between Europe and the Pacific, it will 
always focus on Europe. 
Chapter III investigates the political events in Russia after the introduction of 
“Reasonable Sufficiency” by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Various reform attempts have 
been undertaken since “Reasonable Sufficiency” including Gaidar’s 1989 Economic 
Reforms, Yelstin’s 1992 Military Reform and Yeltsin’s second Military Reform in 1997. 
However, the first serious attempt at military reform was instituted by President Putin at 
the Russian Security Council meeting on 11 August 2000 where he expressed two 
principle points: First, any military-reform policy must be backed by a clear and balanced 
economic assessment that should result in the more efficient use of funds. The economic 
goal is eventually to decrease public spending on defense. Second, the structure of the 
armed forces should correspond to the threats that Russia faces now and in the near 
future.2 But this statement is at odds with Putin’s focus on the Western Pacific, where 
                                                 
2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2000-2001 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p. 110. 
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Russia faces no threat. Furthermore, funds required for all of the military services will be 
curtailed until the war in Chechnya is resolved, thereby preventing a significant increase 
in naval expenditures. The fundamental conclusion is that Putin’s Western Pacific 
strategy is both opportunistic and unsustainable.  
Chapter IV focuses on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy in the Western 
Pacific Region. Russian policy in the region is predominantly opportunistic, and Russia 
has little to offer regional powers such as Japan, Korea or even Vietnam. The loss of Cam 
Ranh Bay as a military base in Vietnam is a key example of the Russian Federation’s 
decline despite assurances by President Putin that the Western Pacific region will be a 
primary focus. China has recognized the Russian Federation’s current weakness and 
desires cooperation in various areas including military priorities, diplomatic and arms 
transfer purposes. However, the only real common interests shared between the two 
countries are a fear of Islamic Fundamentalism and a reduction in U.S. dominance. 
Chapter V will explore the capabilities, limitations and environmental concerns 
for the Russian Navy in general terms. The Russian Federation was officially established 
as an independent state on 31 December 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Somewhat reluctantly, President Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of the 
Russian armed forces on 7 May 1992. During this period, the Russian Navy has suffered 
from under funding more than any other branch of the armed services. The lack of 
resources has forced the Navy to reduce its focus from a blue-water navy to a littoral or 
coastal defense force. 
The structure and capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet will be discussed in 
some detail. Historically, depending on political interests, the Pacific Fleet has fluctuated 
with Russian political interests between a small naval force to a formidable fleet. The 
lack of resources since 1990 has significantly decreased the size of the fleet. However, it 
should be noted many of the ships that were decommissioned had outlived recommended 
life cycles in any case. At the present time the Russian navy does not have sufficient 
capabilities to support an active foreign policy in the Western Pacific region.  Given other 
security concerns and a lack of resources it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will be 
5 
able to build a Navy to support an ambitious foreign policy in the Western Pacific in the 
foreseeable future. 
Chapter VI integrates and analyzes the various factors concerning key political 
and military developments in the Russian Federation’s history. It offers informed 
conclusions about identifiable trends, the implications for future Russian capabilities, and 
the significance for U.S. naval forces and U.S. national security in the region. Its 
conclusion is that a Russian Navy will not pose a significant threat to the U.S. Navy in 
the foreseeable future. 
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II. A HISTORY OF FAILED NAVAL BUILD-UPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout Russia’s history, its leaders have attempted to increase its standing in 
the world through the use of an increased naval presence. Each time they ultimately 
failed. The rise and fall of the Russian Navy is an old story in Russian history that has 
occurred at least three times. Peter the Great founded the Russian Navy, and used it to 
conquer Azov in the south and defeat the Swedes in the Baltic. However his successors 
failed to continue his work and the navy declined to that of a second-rate power. At the 
turn of the 19th and 20th century, the Russian Navy was perceived as the world’s third 
most powerful behind that of Great Britain and France. However, the navy was crushed 
by Japan at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. Finally, the Soviet naval build-up 
spearheaded by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in the 1970s and 1980s appeared to place the 
Soviet Navy on par with that of the United States Navy. But, the Soviet Navy fell into 
decline after Admiral Gorshkov’s death.  
Four reasons help to explain Russia’s historic inability to sustain a naval build-up 
and to project power into the Western Pacific region. First, although vast, Russia has few 
suitable outlets to the sea. Second, Russia lacks the necessary resources to be both a sea 
and land power. As the major threats come from a land invasion, and because the army 
has been vital both for internal security and to maintain Russia’s vast continental empire, 
defense priorities invariably go to the land forces. Third, over time Russia has lacked the 
political stability required to sustain the build-up of a powerful navy. Finally, because 
Russia’s diplomatic, security and economic priorities are essentially focused on Europe, 
Moscow has lacked the resources to project power into the Pacific region. Prior attempts 
at increasing naval presence in the Western Pacific region have invariably failed. When 
Russia is required to choose between Europe and the Pacific, it will always focus on 
Europe. 
B. THE TIMES OF PETER THE GREAT “FATHER OF THE RUSSIAN 
NAVY” 
Tsar Peter the Great is rightly considered the “Father of the Russian Navy.” 
Throughout his childhood, ships, shipbuilding and navigation captivated him. 
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At Lake Pleshcheyevo, one hundred fifty kilometers northeast of Moscow, 
a recreational area was set aside for the young Tsar and his childhood 
friends. A miniature shipyard was created and in it were built replicas of 
Western sailing vessels. This preserve, named the ‘amusement flotilla,’ 
played an important part in Peter's naval education; he and his young 
friends spent all their waking hours sailing about the lake in their small 
ships, engaging one another in mock battles.3 
However, the “amusement flotilla” was just the beginning of his fascination for 
ships.   
In 1688 he discovered in an abandoned shed at Izmailov a small English-
built sailing vessel, which had belonged to his grandfather. He at once had 
the ship repaired (by Karshden Brandt, the Dutch carpenter who had 
largely built the Orel), fitted it with sails, and learned to navigate it. Later 
he referred to it as the ‘little grandfather of the Russian Navy’.4 
He was primarily instructed by Dutch and Swiss teachers due to the lack of 
educational opportunities in Russia. Peter’s “Grand Embassy” of 1696-97 took him to the 
Netherlands and England precisely so that he might learn the techniques and skills that 
made these countries the leading maritime powers of the day. 
Securing unique control of the throne, in 1698, Peter quickly set in motion a 
program to transform Russia into a modern European state. He believed this goal could 
not be achieved without a strong navy and merchant marine that had clear access to the 
sea. The mouths of the Don and Neva rivers were considered the first priorities for future 
Russian dominance.5 In 1689, Turkey and Sweden controlled the mouths of the Don and 
Neva rivers respectively. Russia was prevented from venturing into the Black Sea 
because the northern shores were controlled by Khanates loyal to the Ottoman Sultan. 
However, Russia did control the White Sea and in 1693 Peter ordered the creation of a 
state shipyard, which began a limited shipbuilding program in Arkhangelsk.6 In 1694 the 
shipyard produced three ships: Svyatoye Prorochestvo (Holy Prophesy), Apostol Pavel 
                                                 
3 History of the Russian Navy, Glorious Beginnings: Under the Romanovs, [paper on-line] (accessed 
on 21 August 2001); available from http://www.navy.ru/history/hrn1-e.htm#Under%20the%20Romanovs; 
Internet. 
4 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power. (New York: Macmillan Publishing 




(Apostle Paul) and the yacht Svyatoy Pyotr (Saint Peter). However, access to Europe 
from Arkhangelsk was extremely limited and could not be relied upon year round due to 
the climate and its remoteness. Therefore, access to the Baltic and Black Seas became 
necessary for Russia to begin to become a naval power. 
Russia was involved in numerous military conflicts throughout most of Peter’s 
tenure as Tsar. In 1695, Peter attacked the Turkish city of Azov in his quest to secure a 
port on the Black Sea and was soundly defeated. The defeat occurred due to the 
replenishment effort by Turkish naval forces from the Black Sea. “This defeat lent 
confirmation to Peter’s estimation of the importance of sea power, and he set out to repair 
the deficiencies of his forces in that area.”7 Therefore, shipyards were established in 
Voronezh on the upper Don and at Briansk on the Desna. “By June 22, 1696, the 
Russians had completed 22 galleys and 24 fire ships, as well as some larger craft and 
approximately 1,500 barges, rafts, and small boats.” 8 Upon the completion of this new 
fleet of ships, Peter once again ordered an attack against Azov. The city quickly 
succumbed because the Turks could no longer resupply Azov over water. However, the 
conquering of Azov provided few benefits for Peter because Turkey maintained control 
of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. On 20 October 1696, during council with the 
Boyar Duma, Peter proposed the formation and upkeep of a Russian fleet. “The Boyars 
agreed, declaring, ‘The seagoing ships shall be!’ whereupon the Azov Naval Base was 
founded.” 9  With this proclamation the Russian Navy was born.  This early attempt to 
gain access to the Black Sea failed because in 1711 Peter was forced to surrender Azov to 
the Turks. Nevertheless, the experience had been useful preparation for the Great 
Northern War, which saw Russia gain access to the Baltic. 
In 1700, the Baltic Sea was primarily a Swedish lake controlled by Charles XII.10 
Nevertheless, Peter realized Russia lacked adequate maritime access to Europe from the 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 20. 
9 The History of the Russian Navy: Peter I and the Azov Fleet [paper on-line] (accessed on 21 August 
2001); available from http://www.navy.ru/history/hrn1-
e.htm#Peter%20I%20and%20the%20Azov%20Fleet; Internet. 
9 
10 Charles XII became the King of Sweden in 1697 at the age of 15 and was a brilliant military 
commander. He forced Denmark to make peace (Aug., 1700), defeated the Russians and Narva (Nov., 
1700), and defeated Poland in (1704). He was eventually killed in the Swedish trenches while besieging the 
White and Black Seas; therefore in 1703 he began construction in St Petersburg to shift 
the capital of Russia from Moscow. The construction effort for an effective seaport for 
the navy and merchant marine forces now focused squarely on St Petersburg. “By 
funneling all foreign trade through St. Petersburg he assured the commercial future of his 
new capital.”11 The Great Northern War ensued for over twenty years with Sweden and 
the foothold Peter desired to create a Baltic Fleet was achieved through various battles 
including: Dvina, Ladoga, Vyborg and Gangut (considered the first major naval victory 
for Russia). In 1718 Charles XII, King of Sweden, was killed. The Treaty of Nystadt, 
signed in 1721, ceded significant territorial gains for Peter. It was through the navy that 
many favorable terms were set at Nystadt. The strength of the Navy in the Baltic area 
provided Peter the leverage to gain numerous possessions. From the Treaty Russia 
acquired Livonia, Estonia, Ingria, part of Kurland, and eastern Finland including Vyborg. 
The territorial gains were much greater than Peter had hoped for early in the war and laid 
the foundations for Russia to become a maritime power. Russia was now considered the 
most powerful state in the Baltic. Unfortunately, for Russia, his successors failed to 
maintain his successes.  
Peter the Great was well on his way to establishing Russia as a dominant power 
before his death. At Peter’s death in 1725 the Baltic fleet consisted of 34 battleships, nine 
frigates, and numerous lesser craft operating in three divisions and manned by some 
25,000 officers and men. In the Caspian were 17 sailing and 38 rowing vessels based at 
Astrakhan, Derbent, and Baku. The White Sea also had a small fleet, which included 
several large vessels.12 However, his successors lacked the drive to maintain the Navy. 
Peter’s wife, Catherine I only ruled for two years, but her inept administration of the navy 
nearly brought on complete disaster. … Catherine’s naval policy was one of almost 
complete neglect. She laid down no new ships, completed only five battleships and 80 
galleys which were building at Peter’s death, failed to authorize repairs and upkeep, and 
                                                 
fortress of Fredrikssten. Charles XII, [encyclopedia article on-line] [Infoplease.com] (accessed on 23 
September 2001); available from http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0811458.html; Internet. 
11 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 28. 
12 Ibid. p. 43. A quotation of two or more sentences is typed .05” from left & right margins & single 
spaced.  Delete quotation marks – please check all the way through 
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demanded little in the furtherance of efficient performance.13 After Catherine’s death 
Peter II became Tsar. A regency was established for Peter II, due to his youthfulness, and 
the capital was moved back to Moscow. “All shipbuilding ceased, and naval funds were 
slashed by 50 percent. Shore administration was in complete disorder; ships were greatly 
undermanned and rotting. Admiral Zmaevich, caught stealing, was demoted in rank only 
one grade. In 1728 an order was promulgated forbidding warships to put to sea save for 
the movement of royalty (probably no more than five or six vessels could have gotten to 
sea in any case).”14 Political instability was certainly a factor. As was the fact that Peter’s 
successors concentrated on expanding and consolidating Russia’s land frontier. Sweden, 
Peter’s main maritime rival, was no longer a threat after 1721 and the death of Charles 
XII. Therefore, the navy temporarily useful to Russia, no longer had a major strategic 
role to play. 
C. TURN OF THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY WITH A FINAL 
CULMINATION AT THE BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA 
By the 17th century, Russians had crossed the Urals and reached the Sea of 
Okhtosk. Eastward expansion occurred due to the lure of easy money from the pelts of 
squirrels, otters, martens, beavers, ermine, mink, artic foxes and sables.15 However, food 
shortages occurred with the influx of people, which sparked the attainment of the Amur 
valley. The Qing dynasty regarded the “intrusion” as an infestation of “man-devouring 
demons” and by 1689 had forced the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Moscow 
accepted the loss of the Amur valley so it could secure a trade agreement with China. 
Between 1877 and 1904, Russia experienced a period of rapid naval development. 
Although this naval build-up was significant it was essentially defensive in nature. 
Coastal defense ships were built and naval maneuvers conducted were based on the 
premise that a strong enemy naval force was blockading Russia.16 The expansion, due to 
the persistence of Alexander III and Nicholas II, provided Russia with what appeared to 
be an adequate naval force. In 1893, England and France were the only countries that 
                                                 
13 Ibid. pp. 44-45. 
14 Ibid. pp. 45-46. 
15 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p.20. 
16 Ibid. p. 192. 
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surpassed the number of first-class battleships possessed by Russia.17 However, although 
the Russian Navy appeared powerful on paper, the simple truth was that it was woefully 
overstretched. This was because, from 1895, Russia shifted from building defensive ships 
to the construction of ocean going vessels. The shift in shipbuilding reflected a shift in 
strategy. Russia had decided to expand to the Far East. The problem from a defensive 
perspective was that this would leave Russia and especially the Russian Navy 
dangerously overstretched. The construction of ocean-going vessels occurred to enhance 
Russia’s sphere of influence throughout the world. “By threatening intervention at the 
end of Japan’s war with China, Russia succeeded in acquiring Port Arthur and in 
developing a sphere of interest in Manchuria. This foot hold was strengthened by the 
dispatch of first class battleships to the Far East until the Russian fleet in the Pacific was 
as strong as that in the Baltic.” 18 
Why did Russia expand in the Far East? Alexander III and Nicholas II wanted the 
country to be considered a Great Power, as is the case with many authoritarian rulers, and 
be respected as such. Also, the Russian economy had been slipping and unrest among 
Russian minorities, as well as peasants, was gaining momentum. Therefore, the 
acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula and the occupation of Manchuria were viewed as 
necessary for both economic development and national prestige. Sergei Iulevich Witte 
was ultimately assigned the responsibility to rescue Russia from its declining state of 
affairs by Nicholas II. The occupation of these territories provided Witte the impetus to 
implement his economic plan for Russia. As the Minister of Finance, Witte believed the 
theories of Fredrich List would provide Russia the means to compete with the Great 
European powers. Through his teachings Fredrich List stressed that industrialization will 
create its own markets.19 Witte utilized railroad construction to stimulate industry and 
exploit the natural resources of the Far East. 20 Witte viewed rapid industrial and 
territorial acquisition as Russia’s only hope to modernize and thus to take her rightful 
                                                 
17 With reference to “first class” battleships, England had 35 ships, while France had 16 and Russia 
11. The numbers of armored cruisers were 18, 13, and ten respectively. Protected cruisers of the first and 
second class numbered 67, 27 and 3. 
18 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 192. 
19 Ibid. p. 20. 
20 After graduation from the Novorossiisk University in Odessa Witte began his career in railway 
administration, eventually administering the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad. 
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place beside the industrialized nations of Europe.21 However, Witte ignored portions of 
List’s economic planning and did not properly think through the consequences of his 
economic policy. The adventurous and imperialist policy in the Far East instituted by 
Witte contributed to Russia’s eventual war with Japan in 1904.  
Concerns over the implementation of Witte’s economic policy were greatest in 
the Far Eastern districts themselves. “The Staff of the Priamur Military District observed 
in early 1903 that Russia had failed utterly to integrate the population of Manchuria into 
its economy; since Russian factories had been started there, and those were distilleries 
that produced liquor for the Russian army of occupation.”22 However, the military 
leadership was still concerned about Europe, specifically the Triple Alliance. “During 
1903 Japan made several attempts to reach an agreement with Russia regarding their 
respective interests. None of the negotiations met with notable success, largely because 
the Russian adventurers in the Far East and Nicholas the II alike underestimated the 
Japanese strength and felt there was no danger of war.” 23 Table 124 displays a breakdown 
of Russian and Japanese forces prior to the Russo-Japanese War. However, Japan had 
been planning for the contingency of war and eventually severed diplomatic relations 
with Russia on February 5, 1904. On February 8 the Russo-Japanese War began with 
Japan’s surprise attack on Port Arthur.  
The Russians were completely caught by surprise by Japan’s initial surprise 
attacks on Port Arthur. Military leaders not only in Russia, but also in numerous countries 
throughout Europe, believed Japan would fall quickly to Russia. A comparison of the two 
countries’ resources demonstrated a disparity of ten to one in government revenues, more 
than three to one in population (140 million as compared to 44 million), and nearly sixty 
to one in area, all, of course, in Russia’s favor. In 1903, Japanese naval expenditures 
totaled $2.5 million yen, while Russia totaled $12.3 million—a ratio of five to one. Also, 
                                                 
21 Howard Mehlinger and John Thompson, Count Witte and the Tsarist Government in the 1905 
Revolution, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 23. 
22 TsGvia, f. 400, op.4. d. 60 (materials on the conference of January 25, 1903, about a potential 
withdrawal from Manchuria), ll. 21-22: cited in William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-
1914 (New York: The Free Press, 1992), p. 374. 
23 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 204. 
24 Ibid. p. 207. 
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the Russian Navy held almost a three-to-one superiority in total tonnage.25 Even some of 
the Japanese naval officers were surprised to see the ineptness of the Russian Fleet.  
A Japanese Naval Officer noted in his diary some wide differences in the 
two fleets: It must be admitted now that the European newspapers have 
been very wrong ever since the beginning of the war—in declaring that the 
Russian squadron in the Far East is as powerful as ours. At first sight it 
looks as though it might be so, for they have the advantage over us in 
battleships; but actually we are far stronger, owing to the fact that we 
possessed six magnificent armored cruisers before the arrival of the 
NISSHIN and KASUGA … Our battleships are superior to theirs in 
tonnage, weight of guns, and speed, whilst we posses an enormous 
advantage over them in torpedo boats and destroyers.26 
But, the naval superiority held by Russia was dispersed between its various fleets. 
Therefore, the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet early in the war forced Russia to utilize 
its European reserves. The Black Sea Fleet was useless because international treaties 
forbade the Turkish Sultan to allow the Black Sea Fleet to transit the Straits.  Therefore, 
the only remaining hope for the Far East was to dispatch the Baltic Fleet to the rescue. 
Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s voyage with the Baltic Fleet to defeat the Japanese was the 
prelude to the Battle of Tsushima. The ability of Admiral Rozhdestvensky to take a large 
squadron of ships to the Far East from the Baltic without proper logistics was a feat in 
itself. The fact that the fleet even arrived in the Far East was surprising. 
The lack of friendly ports only exacerbated the voyage of Admiral 
Rozhdestvenskii’s fleet and contributed to its ultimate defeat. The Battle of Tsushima 
was one of the greatest naval battles ever to take place and the losses incurred by the 
Russians were among the heaviest in the history of naval warfare. Tables 2.1 and 2.227 
provide an overview of the Russian and Japanese fleets at the Battle of Tsushima. “Few 
naval battles in history have been as decisive as Tsushima. Thirty-eight of the ships 
entering the battle were sunk, captured, or interred; and of these all were Russian except 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 205. 
26 Capt. R. Grant, Before the Battle of Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese 
Naval Officer, London, 1907, p. 2: quoted by Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea 
Power, p. 211. 
27 Ibid. p. 250. 
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three torpedo boats.”28 The Battle of Tsushima greatly contributed to Russia’s defeat in 
the Russo-Japanese War. 
 
Table 2.1 Russian Fleets at the Battle of Tsushima (From Ref 27) 
                                                 
DATE OF MAIN SPEED
NAME LAUNCH TONAGE BELT TURRET ARMAMENT (KNOTS)
Commander - Admiral Rozhdestvenskii
First Division
Kniaz Suvorov (flag) 1902 13,516   7 3/4 10  4 12"; 12 6" 18
Aleksandr III 1901 13,516   7 3/4 10  4 12"; 12 6" 18
Borodino 1901 13,516   7 3/4  4 12"; 12 6" 18
Orel 1902 13,516   7 3/4  4 12"; 12 6" 18
Osiliabia (flag) 1898 12,674   9 10  4 10"; 11 6" 19
Sysoi-Veliky 1894 10,400   16 14  4 12"; 4 6" 16
Navarin 1891 10,206   16 12  4 12"; 8 6" 15
Nakhimov 1885 8,542     10 8  8 8"; 10 6" 17
Nikolai I (flag) 1889 9,672     14c 18  2 12"; 4 9"; 8 6" 15
Ushakov 1893 4,648     10 8 4 10"; 4 4.7" 16
Seniavin 1894 4,126     10 8 4 10"; 4 4.7" 16
Apraksin 1896 4,126     10 8 3 10"; 4 4.7" 16
Oleg (flag) 1903 6,650     3 3 12 6" 23
Avrora 1900 6,630     2 1/2 8 6" 23
Monomakh 1880 5,593     2 5 6"; 6 4.7" 15 1/2
Dmitry 1885 6,200     2 6 6"; 10 4.7" 16 1/2
Svetlana 1898 3,200     - 6 6" 21
Almaz 1903 3,285     - 12 small guns 20
Zhemchug 1903 3,106     2 6 4.7" 24
Izumrud 1903 3,106     2 6 4.7" 24
Second Division - Rear Admiral Folkersam (deceased)
Third Division - Rear Admiral Nebogatov
Cruiser Squadron - Rear Admiral Enkvist
ARMOR
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28 Ibid. p. 265. 
DATE OF MAIN SPEED
NAME LAUNCH TONAGE BELT TURRET ARMAMENT (KNOTS)
First Division
Mikasa (flag) 1900 15,200   9 10  4 12"; 14 6" 18.6
Fuji 1896 12,500   18 16  4 12"; 10 6" 19.2
Shikishima 1898 14,854   9 10  4 12";14 6" 18.5
Asahi 1899 15,200   9 10  4 12"; 14 6" 18
Kasuga 1902 7,700     6 5 1/2  1 10"; 2 8", 14 6" 20
Nisshin 1903 7,700     6 z5 1/2  4 8"; 14 6" 20
Idzuma (flag) 1899 9,750     7 6  4 8"; 14 6" 22.3
Asama 1898 9,750     7 6  4 8"; 14 6" 21 1/2
Tokiwa 1898 9,900     7 6  4 8"; 14 6" 21 1/2
Adzumo 1899 9,500     7 6  4 8"; 14 6" 20
Yakumo 1898 9,800     7 6  4 8"; 12 6" 20 1/2
Iwate 1900 9,750     7 6  4 8"; 14 6" 21
Kasagi (flag) 1897 4,760      2 8"; 10 4.7" 23
Chitose 1893 4,760      2 8"; 10 4.7" 23
Niitaka 1902 3,400      6 6" 20
Otava 1903 3,000      2 6"; 6 4.7" 21
DECK TURRET
Naniwa (flag) 1885 3,700     3  2 10.2"; 6 6" 18
Takachiho 1885 3,700     3  2 10.2"; 6 6" 18
Akashi 1897 2,700     2  2 6"; 6 4.7" 20
Tsushima 1903 3,400     2 1/2     6.6" 20
Itsukushima (flag) 1889 4,230     1 1/2 4  1 12.5"; 4.7" 16.7
Chinyen 1882 7,350     3  4 12"; 4 6" 14.5
Matsushima 1890 4,230     1 1/2 4  1 12.5"; 12 4.7" 16.7
Hashidate 1891 4,230     1 1/2 4  1 12.5"; 12 4.7" 16.7
DECK TURRET
Suma (flag) 1895 2,700     2  2 6"; 6 4.7" 20
Chiyoda 1889 2,440     1 10 4.7" 19
Akitsushima 1892 3,170     3  4 6"; 6 4.7" 19
Idzumi 1884 2,970     1  2 10.2"; 6 4.7" 17
ARMOR
Second Division - Armored Cruiser Squadron - Vice Admiral Kawamura
Commander - Admiral Togo
Third Division - Vice Admiral Dewa
Fourth Division - Vice Admiral Uriu
Fifth Division - Vice Admiral Kataoka
Sixth Division - Rear Admiral Togo
21 destroyers, 17 first-class and 40 second-class torpedo boats.
 
Table 2.2 Japanese Fleets at the Battle of Tsushima (From Ref 27) 
 
Why did the Russian Navy suffer such a humiliating defeat at the Battle of 
Tsushima? Overall, the problems that have plagued the Russian Navy throughout its 
history led to the defeat. The lack of political stability prevented Alexander III or 
Nicholas II from properly comprehending the problems of the Russian Navy. Alexander 
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III had to deal with the assassination of his father Alexander II by the “People’s Will”29. 
The assassination became the foundation for Alexander III style of rule. He was 
extremely autocratic and continuously had to contend with the same revolutionary threats 
that troubled his father. During Nicholas II’s reign, revolutionary movements were 
growing quickly (Social Democratic Party, Socialist Revolutionary Party) and he also had 
to quell opposition groups rather than focus on military matters. Therefore, interests in 
the Far East were of minimal importance to both Tsars due to the disturbances in the 
urban cities in the west. Neither Tsar completely understood the ramifications of having 
their military forces overstretched in the Far East. Also, they underestimated the strength 
of the Japanese military. Therefore, both Tsars were engaged in activities that prevented 
them from properly prosecuting an adequate policy for the Far East. 
Russia continued to view itself as a European power and the Russian Pacific Fleet 
suffered severely from the over stretch of Russia’s military forces. Alexander III and 
Nicholas II had visions of expanding the Russian Empire, but both were focused foremost 
towards Europe. Of great concern was a possible clash with Great Britain over Russian 
expansion into East Asia. Also, the ‘Triple Alliance’ had been formed in 1882 due to 
German fears of a French revival and Austria-Hungary’s concern with Russian 
expansionist policies in the Balkan region. When Germany failed to re-ratify its 
Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890, Russia allied itself with France to counter the 
Triple Alliance. “To the Ministry of War the Far East was an infuriating distraction from 
Russia’s chief security problem, Central Europe.”30 In March 1903, the Chief of Staff 
told the Tsar, “It is essential to give priority to the main danger over others. And this 
menaces Russia from the powers of the Triple Alliance. They threaten Russia with the 
greatest loss, having the capacity… to deliver a blow against the very center of our 
might.”31 Russia’s concentration had to be maintained in the west due to the possible loss 
                                                 
29 The narodniki attempted to adapt socialist doctrine to Russian conditions; they envisaged a society 
in which sovereignty would rest with small self-governing economic units resembling the traditional 
Russian village commune and held together in a loose voluntary confederation replacing the state. 
Infoplease.com: Naordniki [encyclopedia article on-line] [Infoplease.com] (accessed on 21 August 2001); 
available from http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0834866.html; Internet. 
30 William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914, p. 377. 
31 TsGvia, f. 400, op. 4, d. 56, l. 31: cited in William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-
1914, p. 377.  
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of Poland and its agricultural and industrial centers. Russia did not know the true 
capabilities of the German forces allied against them in the Triple Alliance, therefore the 
first priority had to be the West. Military policy became focused squarely on Europe. 
Because it was bottled up in the Baltic, the Russian Navy’s role in any future European 
war was minimized. Priority would be given to land forces. In turn, the Russian Navy 
focused its forces in the European theatre of operations, but still had to contend with 
inadequate access to the seas. 
The European focus for Russia ensured the Baltic Fleet was Russia’s primary fleet 
regardless of the difficulty transiting the Belts and the Skagerrak. “The largest bases were 
in the Baltic, where St. Petersburg was the center of a whole complex of government and 
private shipyards which included, in addition to smaller establishments, Kronstadt, the 
Baltic Works, the New Admiralty, Izhora, Obuknov, and Galernyi Island.”32 The Black 
Sea Fleet did not carry the same importance of the Baltic Fleet due to Turkish control of 
the Bosporus Strait. However, adequate funding was provided for the missions required 
of the fleet. “In the Black Sea the only bases of importance were Nikolaev and 
Sevastapol. Nikolaev was well guarded and relatively modern, with good dockyards and 
industrial facilities of various types. Sevastapol was less modern but had docks, two 
building slips, and reasonably good fortifications.” The Pacific Fleet was a different story 
altogether. Many Russian naval bases were of poor quality, but Vladivostok was for a 
time the only base of importance in the Pacific, and its facilities were distinctly second-
class to the premier bases of the west. 33 The resources required to maintain not just the 
premier naval bases in the west, but also in the pacific were not available.  
In 1892, Russia and France formed an alliance to counter Germany, the strongest 
continental power at the time. However, naval power was viewed as the key to imperial 
success during this time period. “Battleships were related to the control of world-wide 
commercial interests in a way that armies could never be.”34 In 1898, the German War 
Minister, Admiral Alfred Von Tirpitz, embarked on the strategic decision to launch a 
ship-building program and challenge Great Britain for supremacy of the seas. Germany’s 
                                                 
32 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 202. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Norman, Davies, Europe: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 853. 
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naval aspirations threatened France and Russia, thereby cementing the relationship 
between France and Russia, while at the same time ensuring Moscow’s focus was in 
Europe. 
Witte and the Russian leadership ignored the lack of manpower and revenue in 
the Far East, which was required to maintain Russia’s position there. Russia was not 
going to give any ground in Europe in order to provide for greater access to the Far East. 
“The Imperial government lacked a reservoir of trained men adequate to process [the 
revolution and the Manchurian war] simultaneously.”35 During the Russo-Japanese War 
Nicholas II had come to the realization that the government could no longer afford the 
war and Russia no longer had the resources to wage the war. “The Minister of Finance 
noted in March 1905 that Russia had begun the war in a relatively strong financial 
position, with a budget surplus of 185 million rubles on hand. After that sum had been 
exhausted, it had been possible to cover war expenses with half a billion rubles of foreign 
loans.”36 The war was an utter failure for the Russian Navy and the reputation for 
smartness which the Russian Navy had enjoyed early in the nineteenth century gradually 
diminished until finally the fleet became known as the least efficient maintained by any 
great power.37 
D. THE SOVIET BUILD-UP OF THE 1970S AND 1980S 
The immense size of the Soviet Union had allowed Joseph Stalin to implement his 
development plans due to the country’s seemingly inexhaustible raw materials and virgin 
lands for farming/engineering.38 Stalin’s five-year plans combined with the defeat of 
Hitler in 1945, had allowed Russia to attain its status as a world power. However, it was 
under Nikita Khrushchev that the goal of attaining nuclear parity with the United States 
became a priority and provided the justification Admiral Sergei Gorshkov required to 
create a world-class navy. After the conclusion of WWII, the Soviet navy was considered 
no more than a coastal defense force. The military leadership understood that in the 
1950s the United States could counter any Soviet maneuver with a strategic assault on 
                                                 
35 William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia 1600-1914, p. 403. 
36 Ibid. p. 405. 
37 Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 184. 
38 Malia, Martin, The Soviet Tragedy: A history of Socialism in Russia 1917-1991, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), p. 363. 
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Soviet soil. Admiral Gorshkov Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 
1986, transformed the Soviet Navy from a coastal defense force to a blue-water navy 
powerful enough to challenge the United States.   
During Admiral Gorshkov’s tenure the Soviet Navy became one of the premier 
navies in the world, and was more capable than any other time in its history. The Soviets 
constructed a fleet of submarines, a naval air force, and surface combatants to defend the 
Soviet Union’s sea approaches and coasts in depth. The capabilities required to defend 
the Soviet Union continued to dominate naval requirements; therefore submarine 
construction and deployment to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans was a major factor for 
fleet compositions and out-of-area operations through 1980.39 Table 2.3 and 2.440 
provide a detailed order of battle description for Soviet Naval forces during this time 
period. The immense building period eventually saw the proliferation of naval forces to 
Vietnam, Cuba, Libya and Syria, as well as, small ports in Ethiopia, Oman and Yemen. 
Therefore, one of the underlying principles of the Soviet Navy was to maintain contact 
with Moscow’s proliferating satellites. However, this rationale eventually would lead to 
over stretch for the navy. Even the numbers of naval exercises were increasing in size and 
complexity.  
                                                 
39 Nikita Khrushchev believed that ‘huge’ surface vessels were obsolete and cut funding for long-
range aviation and carrier projects. Submarines were seen as the economical counter to the United States 
Navy. “By 1985, Soviet naval thinking had largely reverted to a defensive strategy based on submarines.” 
Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power, p. 475. 
40 Frank B. Kelso, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations, 1991), p 123. 
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Strike Bombers 185 Tanker/Transport/Training/R&D
BACKFIRE B/C Aircraft 560
BADGER A/C Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare/
BLINDER A Command and Control Aircraft 200
Fighters and Fighter/Bombers 400 BEAR D/J
FITTER C/H BADGER C/H/J
FORGER A BLINDER C/E
FLOGGER B COOT A/B
FULCRUM C CUB B
FENCER A/B/D FENCER E
Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft 480 HORMONE B







Table 2.3 Soviet Navy Active Aircraft Order of Battle:1991 (After Ref 40) 
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Submarines - Nuclear Powered Frigates
SSBN  Ballistic Missile Submarines FF/WFF Frigates
TYPHOON Class 6 KRIVAK I/II/III, NEUSTRASHIMYY,
DELTA I/II/III/IV Classes 43 RIGA Classes 44
YANKEE I Class 11 FFL/WFFL  Corvettes
SSGN  Cruise Missile Submarines GRISHA, MIRKA, PETYA Classes 101
CHARLIE I/II, ECHO II, Patrol Combatants/Craft
OSCAR I/II, YANKEE Classes 43 PGGA/PGG
SSN  Torpedo-Attack Submarines DERGACH, UTKA, NANUCHKA,
AKULA, HOTEL, SIERRA, TARANTUL Classes 74
VICTOR I/II/III, YANKEE Classes 60 PG/WPG  Patrol Combatant
SSAN  Auxiliary Submarines PARCHIM II, PAUK, POTI Classes 50
ECHO II, HOTEL, UNIFORM, WPS  Large Patrol Ship
YANKEE Classes 5 IVAN SUSANIN Class 6
Submarines - Diesel-Electric Powered Miscellaneous Coastal Patrol Craft
SSG  Cruise Missile Submarines (Navy and KGB subordinated)
JULIETT Class 15 MATKA, OSA, MURAVEY,
SS  Torpedo-Attack Submarines STENKA, SVETLYAK TURYA etc.
FOXTROT, KILO, ROMEO Classes 230
TANGO, WHISKEY Classes 100 Amphibious Ships
SSA/SST  Auxiliary Submarines LPD Amphibious Assault Transport Dock Ships
BELUGA, BRAVE, GOLF, IVAN ROGOV Class 3
INDIA, LIMA, XRAY, ZULU LST Amphibious Vehicle Landing Ships
Classes 15 ALLIGATOR, ROPUCHA I/II Classes 32
Aircraft Carriers LSM Amphibious Medium Landing Ships
CVG  Guided Missile Aircraft Carriers POLNOCNY A/B/C Classes 32
KUZNETSOV Class 1 Miscellaneous Amphibious Warfare 
CVHG  Guided Missile VTOL and Helicopter Carriers Craft 68
KIEV Class 4 Mine Warfare Ships/Craft
Cruisers MSF Fleet Minesweepers
CHG  Helicopter-Carrying Missile Cruisers NATYA, YURKA, T-43 Classes 80
MOSKVA Class 2 Miscellaneous Mine Warfare Ships
CGN  Guided Missile Cruisers - Nuclear MHS, MM, MSFT MSS Types 7
KIROV Class 3 Miscellaneous Mine Warfare Craft
CG - Guided Missile Cruisers MSC, MHC, MSIA, MSI Types 155
SLAVA, KARA, KRESTA, Auxiliary Ships
KYNDA Classes 25 Logistics Support Ships 119
Destroyers Intelligence Collectors 56




MOD KILDIN, MOD KOTLIN
Classes 2
 
Table 2.4 Soviet Navy Active Ships Order of Battle:1991 (After Ref 40) 
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In 1956, the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Seas were the primary operating 
areas of the Soviet Navy.41 The European focus of Soviet naval deployment was evident 
for the Soviet naval and political leadership at the height of the Cold War because it 
coincided with the Main Area of Russian interest. Bruce Watson42 cleverly utilizes the 
geographical distribution of “ship days” which displays the areas of the world that were 
most important to the Soviet Union. Tables 2.5 And 2.643 display the number of deployed 
Soviet ships for a particular time and also the amount of power the navy was either able 
to deploy or believed necessary to fulfill its assigned missions and Appendix A correlates 
these activities to political events of the time.44  
                                                 
41 Out-of-area operations encompass all of the world’s ocean areas except Soviet inland waterways, 
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Atlantic Mediterranean Pacific Indian Caribbean
Year Ocean Sea Ocean Ocean Sea Total
1956 500      100                 200      -       -          800         
1957 1,500   600                 200      -       -          2,300      
1958 1,300   1,000              900      -       -          3,200      
1959 2,100   4,100              900      -       -          7,100      
1960 1,600   5,600              400      200      -          7,800      
1961 2,200   2,300              700      -       -          5,200      
1962 4,300   800                 1,400   100      -          6,600      
1963 3,600   600                 1,800   100      -          6,100      
1964 5,300   1,800              2,000   -       -          9,100      
1965 5,400   3,700              2,500   -       -          11,600    
1966 5,500   5,400              2,800   -       -          13,700    
1967 5,800   8,800              3,600   200      -          18,400    
1968 5,900   11,700            4,200   1,200   -          23,000    
1969 9,600   15,400            5,900   4,100   300          35,300    
1970 13,600 17,400            7,100   4,900   700          43,700    
1971 14,800 18,700            6,200   4,000   700          44,400    
1972 14,500 17,700            5,900   8,900   1,900       48,900    
1973 13,000 20,600            6,300   8,900   1,400       50,200    
1974 13,900 20,200            7,400   10,500 1,200       53,200    
1975 13,200 20,000            6,800   7,100   1,100       48,200    
1976 14,000 18,600            6,500   7,300   1,000       47,400    
1977 15,800 16,300            7,500   6,700   1,200       47,500    
1978 16,100 16,600            6,900   8,500   1,300       49,400    
1979 16,900 16,600            10,400 7,600   1,100       52,600    
1980 16,900 16,600            11,800 11,800 700          57,800    
Table 2.5 Out-of-Area Ship Days – Distribution by Geographical Area, 1956-1980 (From 
Ref 43) 
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Atlantic Mediterranean Pacific Indian Caribbean
Year Ocean Sea Ocean Ocean Sea
1956 62% 13% 25% 0% 0%
1957 65        26                   9         0 0
1958 41        31                   28       0 0
1959 29        58                   13       0 0
1960 20        72                   5         3        0
1961 42        44                   14       0 0
1962 65        12                   21       2        0
1963 59        10                   29       2        0
1964 58        20                   22       0 0
1965 47        32                   21       0 0
1966 40        39                   21       0 0
1967 31        48                   20       1        0
1968 26        51                   18       5        0
1969 27        44                   17       11      1             
1970 31        40                   16       11      2             
1971 33        42                   14       9        2             
1972 30        36                   12       18      4             
1973 26        41                   12       18      3             
1974 26        38                   14       20      2             
1975 27        42                   14       15      2             
1976 30        39                   14       15      2             
1977 33        34                   16       14      3             
1978 32        34                   14       17      3             
1979 32        32                   19       15      2             
1980 29        29                   20.5    20.5   1             
Table 2.6 Out-of-Area Ship Days – Percentage Distribution by Geographical Area, 1956-
1980 (From Ref 43) 
The tables demonstrate that the Atlantic and not the Pacific was the main focus of 
out-of-area activity for the Soviet Union due to the Western approaches. The 
Mediterranean was not even considered as vital due to the diminished strength of the U.S. 
Sixth Fleet compared to NATO’s ground forces. “Inversely, Leningrad, Tallinn, 
Kaliningrad, the other Baltic ports, and the strategic industrial complexes are extremely 
vulnerable to sea borne attack and thus have received first priority.”45 Also, the primary 
submarine threat for the U.S. and NATO was and continues to be from the Northern 
Fleet. “For these reasons, the initial Soviet operations involving Soviet security were 
concentrated in the North Atlantic and in the Norwegian and North Seas.”46 It should be 
noted the Pacific Fleet was not ignored during this period of time, but only maintained a 
secondary role because its ports are ideal for defense of the Far Eastern districts. 
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“However, because of the isolation and relatively lesser importance of the East, it initially 
was assigned a lower priority for naval resources than was the West.”47 It was not until 
1974 that the Soviet Pacific Fleet split its operation between the Indian and Pacific 
oceans, which would eventually lead to over stretch for this fleet due to the European 
focus for resources. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, deployments to the Indian 
Ocean were curtailed dramatically, due to the limited resources available to the navy as a 
whole. The Okean Exercises in 1970 and 1975 thrust the Soviet navy to the forefront of 
world navies behind only the U.S. Navy.48 The exercises were designed to demonstrate 
the Soviet Navy’s progress after the 8th and 9th five-year plans. “They were the most valid 
indicators of Soviet naval potential in the early and mid-1970s.”49 The exercises were 
global in scope, but focused primarily on the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. The 
changes were seen in the Okean-70 Exercise in which 200 ships and submarines were 
utilized in the operation. “At the time, Okean-70 was the largest Soviet naval exercise 
ever conducted, and it involved antisubmarine and antiaircraft carrier warfare and 
amphibious landing operations.”50 However, the peak of Soviet naval power would 
quickly come to an end as could be seen when the much-anticipated exercise ‘Okean-80’ 
never materialized. The economy of the Soviet Union could no longer handle the weight 
of the immense defense expenditures, which in turn set the foundation for the political 
instability of the mid to late 1980s. 
The state of economic affairs in the Soviet Union in the mid to late 1980s was 
abysmal. The Defense Minister, General Yazov and the Chief of General Staff, General 
Moiseev realized that the restructuring of the military establishment was inevitable due to 
the economic situation. Military restructuring was championed by four sources: The main 
push for reform came from the General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev. “First, 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Okean 70 and 75 were the first worldwide coordinated Soviet naval exercises to test and improve 
the level of combat skills, as well as the operational readiness/preparedness of naval staffs. Prior to Okean 
70, very few exercises were held “out-of-area” to test the ability to coordinate global operational activities. 
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49 Watson, Bruce, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas 1956-1980, p. 29. 
50 Ibid.  
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Gorbachev’s unilateral reductions had to be implemented, no small challenge.51 Second, 
the civilian critics not only demanded reductions but also offered strong advice about 
what forces to reduce. Third, after more than two years of diplomatic maneuvering with 
the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) forum, the long-enduring 
negotiations for mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) were replaced with a new set 
of negotiations, centered on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). …Fourth, the new 
parliament would undoubtedly add new voices to the chorus of military reformers.”52 It 
was clearly evident the military establishment was being attacked from all sides and was 
in no position to maintain its bloated structure.  
Mikhail Gorbachev understood the economic straits the country was in and 
realized that military reform had to be implemented in order to tackle the deficit and 
carry out sweeping social programs. By 1990, Gorbachev had conceded independence for 
the Eastern European countries that had been controlled by Moscow since the end of 
World War II. In 1990, Lithuania was the first Baltic republic to agitate for 
independence. Soon, other Soviet republics demanded independence. While maintaining 
adequate outlets to the sea became a major priority during the political instability of the 
late 1980s, there was nothing the Russian Navy could do to staunch the break-up of the 
USSR. Russian governments traditionally relied on the Army for internal security and to 
bind the nation together. Hence, large expenditures were reserved for the army. The 
concern for Gorbachev and the leadership of the country was not a foreign attack, but the 
prevention of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet Navy had attempted, but never fully succeeded, to address the problem 
of inadequate outlets to the sea during Admiral Gorshkov’s tenure. Geographic 
constraints prevented a maritime perspective during Soviet times, which has historically 
been the case. This perspective has dictated the fundamental concern for land forces and 
been supported by recurring invasion and occupation throughout Russia’s history. Also, 
arrays of problems such as “choke points” in major operating areas have complicated 
                                                 
51 Unilateral reductions were overarching force reductions for the military and VPK that were 
designed to allow for quality versus quantity in the Soviet armed forces. Mikhail Gorbachev at the United 
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52 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1998), pp. 180-181. 
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naval development. A great deal of access to the open sea for the Soviet Navy was 
through waters that are frozen for significant portions of the year, or from ports that are 
logistically distant from industrial population centers.53 The collapse of the Soviet Union 
only exacerbated the fact the country lacked adequate outlets to the sea.  
Even today, the four primary fleets54 for the Russian Federation must contend 
with the problem of inadequate outlets to the sea. The Northern Fleet has to deal with the 
severe Arctic climate, as well as, the long transit times to operating areas. Also, the 
narrow straits in the Belts and the Skagerrak, which could easily be sealed off  by an 
adversary, confined the Baltic Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet faces similar concerns due to 
restricted access through the Bosporus Straits, which are controlled by Turkey. Finally 
the Pacific Fleet has attempted to alleviate some access restrictions into the Pacific 
Ocean, presented by the Japanese straits, through the maintenance of the naval base 
Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula. However, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok 
are at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line. Their environment is unpleasant, and 
they are remote from Russia’s European focus.55 
The command economy of the Soviet Union, derived from the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, was driven primarily by the military and its requirements. The once abundant 
resources and labor force, that provided the means to develop the Soviet military, were 
being depleted at an alarming rate. 56 Therefore, the rapid growth of the military during 
the 1970s and 1980s placed an enormous economic burden on Soviet society. 
Technological innovations were never properly introduced into the Soviet economy due 
to the specific focus on the military. The incentive for new technologies did not exist in 
the socialist system and only exacerbated the economic problems. “A surprisingly broad 
consensus existed among most of the Soviet elite that the Soviet economy was in serious 
trouble and that the burden of military expenditures was to blame.”57 It was impossible to 
                                                 
53 Choke points occur in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the Baltic and Black Seas. Frank 
B. Kelso, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 5. 
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55 Frank B. Kelso, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, pp. 43-44. 
56 Murray Feshbach, The Soviet Union: Population, Trends, and Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: 
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57 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 115. 
rapidly implement the shift from the production of military to civilian goods in the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, the kind of relief Gorbachev sought, a purely administrative shift in the 
mix of production from guns to butter, could not occur due to the conditions of the Soviet 
economy in the mid-1980s.58 The concern over the lack of resources, not just for the 
military, but also for the population continued to increase.  
As Yegor Ligachev said, ”After April 1985, we faced the task of curtailing 
military spending. Without this, large-scale social programs could not have been 
implemented: the economy could not breathe normally with a military budget that 
comprised 18 percent of the national income.”59 The lack of resources for the military 
eventually led to Mikhail Gorbachev’s insistence for military reform under the policy of 
“Reasonable Sufficiency.” Once again the navy would shift from an ocean going fleet to 
a defensive force and lose funding reserved for the army. In 1990, then Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze claimed the Soviet military had expended 25 percent of 
the country’s GNP. The abundant amounts of resources enjoyed during Admiral 
Gorshkov’s tenure were no longer available.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The three pivotal periods in the history of Russian naval development addressed 
provide the background required for understanding the successes and failures of the 
Russian Navy since Peter the Great. However, the periods of naval primacy have been 
fleeting and unsustained for four reasons: First, Russia has a limited number of outlets to 
the world’s seas. Furthermore, these are poorly situated because they are strategically 
vulnerable or geographically remote. Second, the lack of resources to be both a land and 
sea power has been prevalent throughout Russia’s history. Third, Russia has lacked the 
political stability required to sustain the build-up of a powerful navy. Finally, Russia’s 
interests are primarily European. Prior attempts to increase naval presence in the Western 
Pacific region have invariably failed over time. Throughout Russia’s history, it’s leaders 
have attempted to increase it’s standing in the world through the use of an increased 
naval presence, but have ultimately failed each time. 
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III. ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
“To have a reliable defense with the least possible spending - this is the essence, 
in general, of any military reform.”60 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The numerous attempts for reform in the Russian Navy have failed and will 
continue to fail because they have not been properly implemented and most have been 
undertaken in a disorganized and haphazard manner. The term ‘military reform’ connotes 
many different meanings and it must be properly understood in the Russian context to 
comprehend why reform efforts have taken the course they have. “Military reform in the 
contemporary Russian context is a broad term, very distinct from the concept of reform 
of the armed forces, which refers to the transformation of the military forces belonging to 
the Russian Ministry of Defense and involves both down-sizing the force and its 
transformation into a force that will meet the needs and requirements of Russia in the 
post-Cold War era.”61 However, this thesis will utilize the following definition to better 
characterize attempts at reform from Mikhail Gorbachev to Vladimir Putin. “Military 
reform, on the other hand, is a more all-embracing process which encompasses all the 
military and paramilitary formations of the Russian state and addresses the core political, 
economic, and social questions attached to raising, sustaining, training, arming, 
deploying, and employing a military as an element of Russian national power.”62 The 
description implies that real military reform for Russia is a two-part process: First, 
Russian governments since 1985 have had to overcome the Soviet legacy of a militarized 
state, society and economy, while shifting control of the military to civilians. Second, 
they have had to reestablish the foundation for a ‘new’ military that meets today’s state, 
                                                 
60 Capt 1st Rank V. Vaniyan “Economic Consequences of Disarmament, Effects on MIC,” Morskoy 
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society and economic needs. Unfortunately, for the Russian leadership, they have 
bungled the first portion of the process and been unable to accomplish the second one. 63 
Comprehension of what military reform constitutes is crucial to understand why 
past reform efforts have failed. Also, ideology, culture and economics have prevented 
more structured and organized attempts for naval reform. As a general proposition, 
people in any large bureaucracy or corporation do not want to reduce the importance of 
their position in society. The drive to expand or at the very least maintain their position is 
no different within the Russian Navy, heirs of the once powerful Soviet Navy. The 
attempts to ‘reform’ the armed forces were begun with Mikhail Gorbachev and have 
continued through Vladimir Putin. Numerous people have presented reform programs, 
but the political leaders have had the ultimate responsibility for reform decisions. Mikhail 
Gorbachev and his successors have had to contend with the Soviet Union’s history 
regarding ideological, cultural and economics norms. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin all made their ascendancy 
to power by means of the Communist Party. Each grew up in Western Russia and had 
few ties to the Far Eastern regions. The reforms proposed by each have had little effect 
on the military’s goal of regaining its status as a world power.  
Mikhail Gorbachev studied law at Moscow University and eventually returned to 
his hometown of Stavropol. His standing in the local Communist Party progressively 
increased and in 1970, was appointed the Stavropol Communist Party leader. In 1985, 
despite being the youngest member of the Politburo, he was appointed General Secretary 
of the Communist Party. Upon his selection, Gorbachev proceeded to embark on a 
comprehensive restructuring of the political, economic and social structures in the USSR. 
In 1990, he was awarded the Nobel Peace prize for his contributions for the reduction of 
tensions between East and West. However, Gorbachev’s reform attempts failed to 
significantly improve the economy. The re-emergence of latent ethnic and national 
tensions throughout the Soviet Union was caused by the elimination of political and 
social control by the government. In August 1991, Gorbachev thwarted a coup by 
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communist hardliners, but in return had to cede the majority of his authority to then 
Russian Republic’s President, Boris Yeltsin.  
In 1968, after thirteen years of working for Sverdlovsk construction, Boris Yeltsin 
began to work for the Communist Party and was appointed Secretary of Sverdlovsk in 
1976. Yeltsin received induction into the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 
1981, rose to Moscow Party Chief in 1985 and was appointed to the Politburo in 1986. 
While in the Politburo he became a sharp critique of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform 
measures. Because of this criticism he was forced to resign from the Politburo and 
assume the insignificant job of Deputy Minister for Construction. However, he continued 
to advance radical reform and eventually became Russia’s first popularly elected leader 
upon Gorbachev’s resignation.  
Anti-reform opponents and problems with the economy continuously plagued 
Yeltsin throughout his tenure in office. Yeltsin did manage to further improve relations 
with the West, but the economic collapse in 1998 signaled his eventual downfall. In 
1998, he dismissed the government twice, faced an impeachment vote and it was during 
this period in which Vladimir Putin ascended to power. On 31 December 1999, Boris 
Yeltsin stunned the world by announcing that Vladimir Putin would immediately assume 
the duties as the Russian President until national elections were held in 2000. 
In 1975, Vladimir Putin graduated from Leningrad State University and began to 
work for the KGB. Putin served as a KGB spy in East Germany until 1989 and then 
returned to Leningrad State University to work in the international affairs department. In 
1991, he became the first Deputy Mayor of Leningrad and lured a great deal of Western 
investment to the city. Putin’s work in Leningrad increased his stature and he was 
recruited to work in the Kremlin as an aide for property manager Pavel Borodin. In 1998, 
then President Boris Yeltsin tapped him to be the head of the Federal Security Service, 
the successor to the KGB and was eventually chosen as Prime Minister after the sacking 
of Yeltsin’s Cabinet in 1999. 
Vladimir Putin has been portrayed as a political novice, but has enjoyed 
tremendous support during his tenure as President. In March 2000 he was formally 
elected as the Russian President. Vladimir Putin is a stated pro-market democratic 
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reformer. He has vowed to revitalize the economy, fight corruption, subvert communism 
and build a strong Russia. 
1. Ideology 
By 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev no longer considered nuclear war as a rational 
solution. He informed the Minister of Defense and the General Staff that the party 
rejected a strategy of victory through nuclear war. At the same time, Gorbachev rejected 
the Soviet foundation for Marx’s concept on war, that of a historical process of war 
waged through revolution, alienation and class struggle. In this way, the elimination of 
the long held belief of “international class struggle” redefined the foreign military threat 
for the Soviet Union. National interests were shifted to the forefront of thinking ahead of 
‘class’ interests. This meant that relations with imperialist countries should be 
approached from a perspective shorn of Cold War Nuclear Theory and Marxist historical 
philosophy. 
A fundamental change in political education had to be implemented. “Over the 
next two years military and party ideologist alike would wrestle with Gorbachev’s 
revisions, constructing tortured arguments to reconcile Marx’s concept of class struggle 
with ‘new thinking’ and the primacy of ‘humankind interests’.64 This new realism in 
Soviet foreign policy forced a debate within the military and political leadership 
concerning threats to the Soviet Union and how they should be addressed. Even in this 
new atmosphere, many military and political leaders clung to time-honored Marxist-
Leninist ideology and sabotaged many government-mandated changes. In doing so they 
found support among those adamantly opposed to Gorbachev’s new approach. 
2. Culture 
Cultural problems are misleading in peacetime and tend to give a deceptive 
representation in wartime. Russian cultural development originated in Byzantium and 
was fueled by the Orthodox Church and in a small part by Western and Asian values. 
Russians have always lived a ‘hard’ lifestyle and for the most part been culturally 
isolated. Russians have dealt with terrible weather and in many cases a flat and tedious 
setting. “The geographic and climatic conditions of their home land, the history of their 
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nation, the origin and cultural evolution of their race, their social structure, and the 
characteristics of their political-economic system have interacted to create the specifically 
Russian national characteristics, attitudes, values, and beliefs.”65 While being able to 
endure great hardships, a focused and deliberate approach traditionally dictated the 
patterns of life. Individual initiative was seldom rewarded in a population sunk in for 
idleness and a general apathy. A history of political and bureaucratic tyranny bred 
fatalism in the Russian people. Reformers with an idealistic vision for the future tended 
to think in terms of systems that would somehow harness the repressed energies of the 
Russian people to transform the nation as a whole and to create a new “Russian Man.”  
Historically, Russian/Soviet governments imposed autocratic and bureaucratic 
rule to control its citizens through exploitation and oppression. Decision-making was 
centralized, ruthless and arbitrary. This style of rule cultivated an atmosphere of ‘passive 
submission’ to authoritative figures. Personnel initiative was stifled and the completion or 
actual commencement of a task would not be undertaken without constant prodding and 
supervision. Generations settled into an attitude of acceptance of the most arbitrary 
decisions out of a sense of fatalism and self-preservation. A lack of understanding and 
knowledge of the outside world led to an ingrained distrust of foreigners.  
By 1914, the Russian social structure consisted of a small upper and middle class 
and a vast mainly rural lower class. The lower class received few benefits for work, 
which created a careless approach. Today sailors require constant supervision.  
The Navy man finds that he needs constant motivation, direction, and 
supervision to overcome his tendency of idleness, his apathy, his plodding 
approach to work, his reluctance to exercise initiative, and his 
unwillingness to discipline himself, or to depend on himself. He seems to 
lack the ability to organize his fellows and his work spontaneously and 
effectively. For a modern sailor he is technically undeveloped, crude, and 
haphazard in his work. Given authority, he is likely to be bureaucratic and 
exercise power arbitrarily and harshly.66 
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Even the technically proficient officer corps is narrowly educated and cannot 
compensate for a lack of an effective petty officer corps. The cultural problem was 
exacerbated by the economic downturn from the 1980s through today.   
3. Economics 
The initial impetus for Gorbachev’s reforms stemmed from the fact that the Soviet 
Union could no longer afford the military spending of the past. The country suffered from 
a command economy, in which military spending figured prominently during the Soviet 
era. “The Soviet version of centralized control and management of almost all the affairs 
of a country was inherently inefficient and usually poorly executed.”67 Today Russia is 
attempting to correct past deficiencies and transition to a market economy, but continues 
to have a GDP smaller than Argentina.  
Just how have economics affected the Russian Navy?68 By 1978, the Department 
of the Navy delivered over 1300 ships and auxiliary vessels to more than thirty countries. 
Between 1976-1988 over 200 shore support facilities were delivered to foreign 
customers. Up until 1991, due to ideological reasons, numerous amounts of equipment 
and weapons were delivered at no charge to Soviet satellites and client states. Upon the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the ability to spend at will ceased. The conflict in Chechnya 
diverted crucial funds earmarked for the Navy. In December 1999, Admiral V. 
Kuroyedov expressed his concerns over the deterioration of the Russian Navy at the 
Conference of the Council of Security of the RF. Kuroyedov’s discussion of the state of 
shipbuilding and repair is best expressed by his comments about the cruiser Moscow. 
“The final stage in the repair of the guided missile cruiser, ‘Moscow’, was completed in 
the Black Sea Fleet. When, on 21 December 1990, the missile cruiser, ‘Slava’, departed 
to undergo ship-repairing operations in Nikolayev, nobody would have imagined that this 
repair process would actually exceed the time that it took to build the ship itself.”69The 
ship was renamed the Moscow to elevate its status and priority in the navy. However, 
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how can you say things were accomplished when you can’t even get the premier ship to 
complete a yard period that occurred over eight years? Ultimately, the Navy of the 
Russian Federation has suffered due to the various attempts at reforms, which have not 
been implemented in a well thought out manner. 
B. GORBACHEV AND “REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY” 
Gorbachev viewed the world as one in which the two superpowers (United States 
and USSR) followed policies that threatened to bring about their mutual destruction. 
Each was armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons. Each planned to adopt offensive 
strategies at the outbreak of hostilities. How could this be changed? Gorbachev identified 
the reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides to a point of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ as 
the answer, which, he expressed at the 27th party congress. Reasonable sufficiency came 
to be known as “…the minimal quantitative and qualitative level of military capability of 
a state that reliably guarantees its security and does not create a real military threat to 
other countries...”70 
As a result of “reasonable sufficiency,” a fundamental change in political 
education had to be implemented. “Over the next two years military and party ideologist 
alike would wrestle with Gorbachev’s revisions, constructing tortured arguments to 
reconcile Marx’s concept of class struggle with “new thinking” and the primacy of 
“humankind interests.”71 The change in political ideology forced a debate concerning the 
threats to the Soviet Union and how they should be addressed. For the first time in the 
history of the Soviet Union the military doctrine was to be a matter of public debate and 
scrutiny. Gorbachev also saw the Main Political Administration (MPA) as a control of the 
military by the military.72 Therefore, the major goal in perestroika for the military was to 
bring the military under the genuine control of the civilian authorities.73 Initially, the 
military leadership promoted Gorbachev’s new doctrine. But this changed, when they 
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realized that personnel and weapons would be cut. The military leadership had been 
taught from a young age that imperialism was the root of all wars and responsible for the 
majority of past conflicts. Problems began to arise at the realization that reasonable 
sufficiency did not apply to nuclear weapons. Now they became concerned with cutting 
forces too deeply before the US and NATO countries followed suit. The question was 
then asked: would the West be allowed to gain strategic superiority? Once this was 
realized, many people resisted the change in focus and clung to Marxist-Leninist 
ideology as a way to sabotage any reasonably structured military reforms. The event that 
finally set Gorbachev’s military reform measures in motion was the Mathias Rust fiasco.   
1. Mathias Rust Fiasco 
On May 28, 1987, Mathias Rust (West German Youth) landed a small Cessna 
aircraft in Moscow near Red Square. Mikhail Gorbachev was out of the country and felt 
the stunt was allowed by the military leadership to embarrass him politically. If so, the 
event boomeranged on the Russian military leadership, who were turned into the 
laughing stock of the world for the failure to intercept Mathias Rust’s aircraft. The 
technology utilized by the Soviet Military was more than adequate to track and intercept 
the aircraft. However, military morale was at such a low ebb that soldiers were apathetic 
and had been afraid to give the specific order to shoot down the small airplane down.74 
“L’ Affair Rust” triggered the first attempt at military reform since those of Stalin 
prior to World War II. As Anatolii Chernayev stated, “The time again is ripe for a 
cardinal reform. For a beginning, an unavoidable ‘detail,’ but important: the minister of 
defense must be a general of a new type. And he should not be a member of the 
Politburo. Let him always attend its sessions in order to know what the policy is. But in 
the formulation of policy, you can go around him and do without him.” However, other 
concerns were also addressed. Specifically, the “vital necessity to abandon the 
multimillion-man army and its total conscription system… A professional, cadre army is 
needed-quality not quantity.”75 Therefore, Gorbachev’s “perestroika”76 would not occur 
                                                 
74 The destruction of Korean Air 007 in 1984 still loomed in many military leaders minds. 
75 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, pp. 108-109. 
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76 Perestroika or “Restructuring” was the Soviet Economic and Social Policy of the late 1980s. It was 
an attempt to transform the stagnant, inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a 
decentralized market economy. Perestroika [encyclopedia on-line] [Infoplease.com] (accessed on 8 
October 2001); available from http://aolsvc.aol.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0838284.html; Internet. 
without a major shift in military policy. Gorbachev had been pushing for arms control 
since 1985. However, he had not addressed the issue of overall military reform and 
Mathias Rust provided him with the catalyst. 
The Mathias Rust incident resulted in the sacking of the Minister of Defense 
Marshal Sokolov. Dmitirii Yazov replaced Sokolov, and the purge of senior personnel 
began shortly after his appointment. “Even during Stalin’s bloody purge of the Red Army 
in 1937-38, the percentage of change in top level posts was not as high.”77 The aftermath 
of the Mathias Rust affair had frightened the senior military leadership. But convincing 
them to undertake a fundamental reform of the military was another issue. Self-
preservation for each service chief became difficult due to Gorbachev’s insistence on 
reform. Gorbachev understood the conservative outlook of the military leadership and 
their resistance to his new thinking. To bolster his case with the public, in 1987 
Gorbachev published ‘Perestroika and New thinking’ in both Russian and English. The 
drive to change the ideological thinking in the Soviet Union had begun.  
However, Gorbachev’s constant preoccupation with political reform prevented 
him from addressing his economic initiatives, and in turn, military reform. In 1991, out of 
frustration over his inability to set up a structured reform, Gorbachev ordered unilateral 
cuts in the armed forces. These cuts initiated a general disintegration of the armed forces. 
Delay and resistance to reform had left the military leadership ill prepared to deal with 
unilateral reductions. Many military leaders wanted to overthrow the government, but 
dared not because no one would take the lead. Hypocrisy, mistrust and careerism crippled 
the response of the party and military to Gorbachev’s initiatives.  Officially, the Soviet 
military ceased to exist on the last day of 1991 upon the demise of the Soviet Union, 
however it should be noted that Russia preserved the military establishment. Troop 
withdrawals from Eastern Europe, budget reductions, the conscription revolt78 and 
general deterioration of discipline and order had to be addressed. The progress of reforms 
had been haphazard, and provided little relief for the military. Ultimately, Gorbachev did 
                                                 
77 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 110. 
78 The Conscription Revolt began in 1989 due to the policy of perestroika. In 1988, the media focused 
on the negative aspects of military service, therefore damaging concerns about the military spread. In 1989, 
the public felt the best way to remain safe was to avoid the draft. William E. Odom, The Collapse of the 
Soviet Military, pp. 292-297. 
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not back draft legislation on military reform that was proposed by parliament. “Instead, 
he allowed a stalemate between the defense ministry and the parliamentary reformers.”79 
However, perestroika did allow for numerous recommendations for military reform to be 
presented, which should not be ignored. 
2. Various Reform Suggestions 
Gorbachev’s “perestroika” allowed virtually all sectors of Soviet society to 
express opinions regarding the path that military reform should follow. However, 
Gorbachev and the Duma sanctioned only one, the Committee on Defense and Security.80 
Many members of the committee favored military reform and attempted to structure it 
similar to the United States model. Strong opposition came from the Ministry of Defense 
and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), which simply refused to divulge 
information. This action brought about the “Law on Defense” that would define the 
relationship between the military and the parliament. On 20 October 1989 a draft bill for 
the “Law on Defense” was presented to the Supreme Soviet and was quickly put on the 
back burner. 
 While the Committee on Defense and Security was formulating its reform 
proposals the Ministry of Defense was also organizing its own proposal. General 
                                                 
79 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 202. 
80 Committee was commissioned by the Supreme Soviet and was responsible for reform not only in 
the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), Committee for State Security 
(KGB) and the Military Industrial Commission (VPK).  
Major Vladimir Lopatin in June of 1990 was made the chairman of the Commission for the Preparation 
and Implementation of Military Reform in the USSR.80 Due to foot dragging from the military leadership, 
the commission was forced to enlist the services of prominent scholars. In 1990, a two thousand-page 
document was published, which was subsequently rejected by the military, but none-the-less approved by 
the parliamentary subcommittee on the armed forces.80 Military opposition produced a backlash in the 
Ministry of Defense and many of the reformers on the committee were pressured into renouncing the 
commission’s findings. Of note, the findings by the committee focused not on the balance of conventional 
forces or nuclear weapons, but on life inside the military and how to make it better.  
Gorbachev had desired a bottom up review of the military such as this, but he ignored the deeply 
rooted resistance to reform of his military leadership. It should also be noted that Gorbachev never fully 
supported the reform measures posed by Major Lopatin’s committee. Even if Gorbachev had wanted to 
implement some of the measures, the push for independence in Lithuania and the other Baltic Republics 
forced him to rely on the military leadership once again.80 If military repression were to be utilized he 
would require the military leaderships full backing. Therefore, the military leadership used their new found 
leverage with Gorbachev to initiate their own internal reform measures as a means to counter those coming 
out of the Duma and the Kremlin. 
The eventual report dealt with conscription, civilian control of the military, force structure, budgets, 
morale welfare and recreation and a cut in the communist party influence over the military. William E. 
Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, pp. 184-185. 
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Moiseev headed an interdepartmental commission for military reform, organized by the 
Minister of Defense Yazov. The military leadership argued that  ‘outsiders’ could not 
truly understand nor comprehend the requirements of military restructuring. The 
commission eventually noted five major areas that required attention for proper reform.81 
The proposed reforms of the Lopatin commission were expected to require nine or ten 
years to complete. The infighting only compounded the chaotic nature of the reform 
process.82 The military leadership managed to provide their own reform and circumvent 
the Lopatin commission because the “Law on Defense” was not enforced. Therefore, the 
military leadership’s slow and deliberate pace of reform continued.  
The Scholarly review is the last valid response to Gorbachev’s  “perestroika” for 
reform suggestions regarding the military. Scholars at the Institute for the Study of the 
USA and Canada (ISKAN) viewed security under Gorbachev’s “new thinking” as 
“indivisible” and military means alone would no longer suffice. The term “Defensive 
Sufficiency” was coined during this time and, in 1989, two scholars from the Institute for 
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Georgii Kunadze and Sergei 
Blagovolin, confronted the military leadership and explained to them the term in a down-
to-earth language.83 In their view, too many military assets were deployed in the Far East. 
                                                 
81 (1) Comprehensive restructuring of organizations and methods of work. A ‘qualitative renewal” of 
manning, force structure, production, procurement and management systems. A reduction in personnel, 
staffs and educational institutions would take place. (2) Defensive doctrine. Nothing new was noted with 
the exception of retaliatory military operations. Therefore, training and planning would be revised. (3) 
Military conscription should be retained, but concessions for the future were made and in 1992 ‘contract’ 
soldiers would be implemented. No national military formations due to interethnic tensions. (4) MPA 
political organs would be retained, but had to distinguish their educational and party functions. (5) Social 
support for servicemen and families. The main problem with troops returning from Eastern Europe. 
Increase pensions.  
82 The Navy would accomplish these tasks through four methods; (1) Averting War, (2) Repelling 
Aggression, (3) Protection of Troops and Facilities from sea borne strikes and (4) Depriving the enemy’s 
use of contiguous waters for purpose of offensive operations. The naval leadership knew NATO and the 
United States were not reducing forces in relation to Soviet reductions. In response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
promise for reform, Fleet Admiral Chernavin printed his view for the post Soviet Navy in Morskoy Sbornik 
(November 1991). Chernavin saw a two-fold purpose for the Navy: deterrence and SLOC interdiction and 
protection. 
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83 The first issue was to discard the old ideological thinking. Many third world countries defended by 
the Soviet Union no longer required attention and drained the military economically, specifically in the 
Navy. “By dropping ideological lenses, one could see that the Navy ought to be radically reduced.” The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was viewed as the only serious military threat to warrant 
attention. The second issue concerned “how” the Soviet Union should be defended. They felt that, for 
defense purposes, the Soviet Union should be broken up into regions. The third issue was with Soviet 
domestic interests. The economy had to be the primary focus, thereby relegating military requirements to a 
secondary or possibly even a tertiary position. The “military-industrial complex” of the command-based 
By allowing the United States to be the stabilizing factor in the Far East, Washington 
would be forced to bear the economic, military and political burden.  
Both Kunadze and Blagovolin agreed, “the Soviet Union had to cease frightening 
the world with military power, abandon old ideological formulas, and reduce its military 
forces to modest levels.”84 For this reason, they were highly critical of Gorshkov’s naval 
doctrine of “global presence” and “force projection,” arguing the buildup only provided 
the United States Navy the ammunition to increase its capabilities, thereby obliging the 
Soviet Navy to respond in kind.  
C. YELTSIN’S FIRST MILITARY REFORM ATTEMPT 
In 1992, military reform became a political struggle by the executive and 
legislative branches to gain control over the military. The assault on the Russian White 
House occurred in October 1993 and only one month later, President Boris Yeltsin 
proclaimed that a new military doctrine would be implemented. Reformers became 
optimistic with Boris Yeltsin’s ascendancy to power. However, the preceding political 
struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev prevented any decisive action concerning 
military reform. Implementing reform had dramatic personnel ramifications and would 
leave a taste of ‘bad blood’ between the military and civilian leadership. The most 
important cause for friction was the appointment of Yevgenii Shaposhinikov’s as the 
Commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Armed Forces. 
Shaposhinikov was reform minded, but did not implement expected changes. Therefore, 
Shaposhinikov was replaced and Yeltsin’s first genuine attempt at military reform 
occurred under the auspices of the new Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. 
Grachev began his reform attempts in the wake of the reduction of the CIS armed 
forces framework. Events in Russia and the “near abroad”85 dictated the path he chose for 
                                                 
economy had to be dismantled and restructured. 
Blagovolin was quick to point out the continued pace of the Soviet military buildup since World War 
II, even though it had achieved parity with the United States and no major attack on the Soviet Union had 
occurred. He underlined the misconception by military leaders in their understanding of western 
democracies, in particular the political and social forces that prevented aggressive foreign policies without 
the threats of a large enemy military force. Therefore, Soviet military forces should not build against any 
one country or ideology, but only guarantee the protection of the Soviet Union itself. 
84 Ibid, p. 157. 
85 The near abroad is commonly referred to as the border regions of the former Soviet Union. 
42 
military reform. The decision for leaving the former Soviet military organization intact 
occurred due to various conflicts in Russia’s “near abroad.” Also, Yeltsin wanted to 
ensure the loyalty of the newly created CIS armed forces due to the growing quarrels 
with the Supreme Soviet, which culminated at the Russian White House in October 
1993.86 The first stage of Grachev’s reforms produced a fifty percent reduction in the 
‘central apparatus’ of the Ministry of Defense. The second stage was to establish a 
‘mobile’ elements command.87 However, throughout the reforms sponsored by Grachev, 
President Yeltsin assumed a hands off approach and allowed the military a free hand in 
structuring their own reform measures. “Without clear-cut guidelines, not knowing what 
kind of enemy to counter, with President Yeltsin as a Commander-in-Chief who is 
unwilling or unable to give extensive political leadership to the armed forces, and with 
utterly insufficient budget funding, the Russian armed forces under Grachev had no 
chance to ‘reform’ in any meaningful way, wrote editor of the Security Dialogue Pavel 
Baev”88 The leaders of the newly formed republics began to assume a major role in 
military policy for their respective countries. On the whole, the republics sought to 
dismantle the Soviet military in their countries. But their insecure political base hindered 
their efforts. Throughout the confusion, numerous ideas were expressed, but few were 
implemented. 
Military reform and the economic crisis worsened inter-service rivalry. Numerous 
high-ranking military officials, Russian admirals prominent among them, publicly 
expressed their opposition to military reform. In 1995, Colonel V. Sokolov alleged the 
                                                 
86 Traditional markets were lost and living conditions in Russia deteriorated due to the hard-line 
economic policy “shock therapy.” A political struggle between Yeltsin and the Parliament ensued. On 21 
September 1993, Boris Yeltsin declared Parliament dissolved and that new elections would be held on 12 
December 1993. An emergency session of Parliament was held and its supporters barricaded the Russian 
White House and refused to obey Yeltsin. On 3-4 October 1993, violent clashes occurred within the 
eventual arrest of the leaders in parliament. On 26 February 1994, all anti-Yeltsin leaders were pardoned 
and released from jail. Civil War in Moscow [Paper online] (accessed 14 August 2001); available from 
http://www.cs.toronto.edu/rmes/russia/period/october93.html; Internet. And Baev, Pavel, “Putin’s Military 
Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency” [Paper on-line] [Security Policy Library no.6-2001, 
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 2001] (accessed 14 August 2001); available from 
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/publikasjoner/sp/2001/6-2001.htm; Internet. 
87 The Mobile Elements Command was designed for special mobile forces that could be rapidly 
deployed in any part of Russia’s extended land borders to deter any possible threat. Felgenhauer, Pavel, 
Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure [newspaper article on-line] [Svedonya newspaper, Moscow, 




very idea of aggression between the Russian Federation and a US/NATO alliance was 
irrational.89 In his view, the attempt to preserve a navy only slightly inferior to that of the 
United States was an inappropriate use of funds, given the diminishing access to the seas 
and a greater prominence given to the issues requiring land forces. Nuclear weapons 
would provide the “reasonable sufficiency” Gorbachev and others had prescribed years 
earlier in case of a foreign threat. 
To counter Colonel Sokolov’s arguments, Vice Admiral N. Zakorin replied that 
the Russian Federation’s security concerns include political, economic, social, ecological, 
information and military matters. Therefore he pointed out that the Russian Federation 
must be concerned with the Navy for three reasons: First, developed states require navies 
for power projection in order to play an active role within the world community. The 
Navy’s fundamental distinction from the other branches of the armed forces lay in its 
ability to operate constantly and systematically away from state boundaries. As Russia’s 
First Deputy Minister A Kokoshin noted: “Do not forget that the Navy also is a special 
state instrument by which not only purely military, but also political missions are 
accomplished. I have in mind the showing of the Russian flag. I am convinced we should 
accomplish the later constantly and there is no place here for a bookkeeping approach.”90 
Second, Russia would be turning its back on the 300-year history of its navy. Third, 
navies and economic development go hand in hand.91 Furthermore, he proposed that Vice 
Admiral Zakorin’s thoughts appeared to fall on deaf ears and the Fleet Admirals saw a 
need for drastic measures.  
In March 1996, admirals from each of the Russian Federation fleets addressed 
their concerns to the Duma and said the Russian Federation has lost its domination of the 
Black, Baltic and Caspian Seas as well as of key strategic regions of the world’s oceans. 
It did not appear as if the country’s leadership cared at all about the navy. Western 
countries were not negotiating the reduction of their navies to fall in line with RF 
reductions. “Two-thirds of our basing facilities have been lost in these regions (the cities 
                                                 
89 Alters his view after the ‘air war’ campaign by NATO in Kosovo. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Vice Admiral N. Zakorin and Colonel N Dolbunov, “Navy in Politics of National Security,” 
Morskoy Sbornik, 19 October 1995, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 25 
April 1997, FTS19970425003124, p. 2. 
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of Tallinn, Riga, Lijepaja, Odessa, Nikolayev, Donuzlav, Kerch, Poti, Izmail, and 
others)—sites that Russia gained in the 18th century in the struggle for access to the 
seas.”92 Countries now had the capability to exert pressure on Russia due to irrational 
cuts in the fleets. The following list represents key concerns provided by the admirals:  
• Number of ships cut in half. Sea based aviation by 60 percent. Personnel 
cut in half.  
• Manning levels at 65-70 percent.  
• 30-70 percent of ships and equipment is obsolete or fails to meet today’s 
standards. Modern ships will only account for 10 percent in 2000.  
• No new missile submarines have been built since 1991.  
• Over 140 nuke subs retired from service. No steps have been taken to 
solve the problem of salvaging them. 
• 300 warships, 80 combat launches, 80 percent of all support ships require 
shipyard repairs. The problem is accentuated by the lack of a long-term 
state program for military shipbuilding.  
• Funding for Material and Technical support is weak. 
• Reduced capabilities in the Navy’s combat effectiveness to accomplish 
missions has been reduced in the oceans by 45-50 percent and the near sea 
zones by 30 percent93 
“This kind of so called naval reform, which has led to a sharp decline in the 
Navy’s combat assets, should be recognized as unacceptable for the Russian state, since 
Russia’s geostrategic position has greatly deteriorated, and serious damage has been done 
to its defense capability and security the admiral’s report concluded.”94The Russian 
Federation’s new military doctrine (1993) did not address the concern for maintaining the 
                                                 
92 Fleet Admiral N.D. Sergeyev and others, “Admiral’s Appeal to State Duma,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 
March 1996, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 01 March 1996, 
FTS19960301000916, p. 1. 
93 Ibid, p. 2.  
94 Ibid, p. 2. 
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state’s naval might as an element of national security. It only dealt with the reduction of 
naval forces and limiting their activity. The Duma did not act in 1994-95, nor had a single 
proposal in the parliamentary hearings of October 25, 1995 on the question of the 
Russian Navy been realized. An appeal from the Chairman of the Federation Council of 
the Russian Federal Assembly to the Russian President of May 26, 1995 also went 
unanswered. A presidential decree signed in June 1995 “On Urgent Measures to Support 
the Combat Readiness of Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces” and a subsequent decision 
adopted by the Russian President on August 10, 1995 on financing measures set forth 
went unfulfilled. The navy felt that, of all the branches of the Armed Forces, they had 
been called upon to make the greatest sacrifice. 
However, it was not just the admirals who were expressing their displeasure with 
reforms. In July 1996, Captain 1st rank Sergey Bondar addressed the problems of 
manning ships and cited various reasons: 
• Introduction in 1991 (in accordance with presidential edicts) of deferments 
from the draft for military service for students of daytime higher education 
institutions and vocational education.  
• Expansion of benefits to draftees for state of health and family status and 
the granting as of January 1, 1995 of the right of deferment from call-up 
for students of tekhnikums and specialized vocational-technical schools. 
• Ship manning at 75 percent. April 1995 adoption of the law “On Military 
Obligation and Military Service” (canceling deferments from call-up of 
citizens for military service and with the increase in the term of active 
military service on two years, the situation with seamen and petty officer 
manning of fleets has changed for the better). Therefore in 1996 manning 
should be at 85 percent. Naval vessels must be at 90-95 percent for 
adequate manning. 
• Seaman and petty officers, short-term leave personnel, hospital patients, 
and those discharged to the reserve count against manning figures.  
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• In 1995, 34 percent of draftees were deemed unfit for duty due to medical 
reasons. 
• Education level is declining. In 1991, 98.8 percent of incoming personnel 
had secondary education, whereas in 1995, only 32 percent had. It has 
become difficult to teach naval specialties to seaman and petty officers.95 
The appeals by the Fleet admirals and Captain Bondar appeared to have some 
effect when, in September 1996, Aleksandr Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council and 
national security assistant to the Russian president, proposed another look at how military 
reforms were being conducted in the Russian Federation. “Deep, radical, quality 
transformations of the state’s entire military system must be accomplished insisted.” 
Lebed insisted.96 Lebed proposed a civilian approach to military reform that would be 
directed by parliament and the Security Council and not the Minister of Defense, as had 
been the case in 1992. In Lebed’s view, what occurred since 1991was not reform, but a 
system of “chaotic measures” to reduce and reorganize the military establishment. The 
level of readiness in the armed forces dropped due to this mish-mash of actions.  
Even President Yeltsin admitted the failings of reform. “On February 23, 1995, 
after a wreath-laying ceremony at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Yeltsin said ‘the 
army has begun to fall to pieces,’ precisely because ‘we have been late in introducing 
reforms.’”97 In 1996, once again reform became a political issue and Yeltsin utilized it 
for his re-election campaign. He promised not only reform, but also an end to the draft in 
Russia by the year 2000. However, Yeltsin never followed through with the intended 
reforms, which seemed only a political ploy to gain time. Fundamental military reforms 
appeared doomed until President Yeltsin’s appointment of Marshal Igor Sergeyev as the 
new Minister of Defense in 1997.  
                                                 
95 Captain First Rank Sergey Borisovich Bondar, “Navy Manning Problems,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 
July 1996, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 March 1997, 
FTS19970328000788, p. 1. 
96 Colonel Yuriy Churkin, “Lebed Interview on National Security Priorities,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 
September 1996, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 01 September 1996, 
FTS19960901000514, p. 1. 
97 Pavel Felgenhauer, Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure 
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D. YELTSIN’S SECOND MILITARY REFORM ATTEMPT 
The second attempt at military reform was preceded by President Yeltsin’s annual 
address to the Federal Assembly in March 1997. In this speech, he stated that it was 
necessary for five things to occur for military reform to work.98 However, no new reform 
measures were presented. During this period then Defense Minister Igor Rodionov was 
attempting to implement his version of military reforms in the summer of 1997 after the 
defeat in the First Chechen War. “Defence Minister Rodionov was desperately pushing 
forward quite elaborate and far-going plans; there were also several alternative proposals 
developed by civilian experts.”99 However, President Yeltsin opted for a reduced 
approach from what was presented by Rodionov. “The military reform launched in mid-
1997 was essentially a packaging of several long-overdue structural measures such as, 
merging the Air Defence into the Air Force or reducing the number of military 
districts.”100 The only major change presented was to integrate all components of the 
strategic forces under one command, however Air Force and Navy Commanders 
effectively nullified this proposal. Therefore, the reduced approach by Yeltsin was 
enacted.  
President Yeltsin appointed two commissions to direct military reform, while the 
Minister of Defense also proposed his outline for reform measures. The first commission 
was headed by Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and was to address technical issues. 
The second was headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais and was to 
address financial issues. Finally, Minister of Defense Sergeyev proposed the unification 
                                                 
98 (1)To bring the state’s entire military organization in line with the potential threats and challenges to 
Russia’s security, within the country’s economic capabilities. The structure of the armed services and the 
Armed Forces will be optimized; the number of Ministries and departments that are allowed to have armed 
formations will be cut; and the numerical strength of the Armed Forces and other troops will be reduced. 
The authorized strength of the Armed Forces is to be cut by 200,000 this year alone. (2) To strengthen 
social protections, social support and retraining in civilian specialties for officers and warrant officers 
discharged from the Armed Forces, and other troops in connection with their reduction, on the basis of 
existing and specially drafted state programs. (3) To build highly mobile forces as a component of military 
districts on the regional principle. (4) To put the manning of the Armed Forces and other troops onto a 
contract footing, as the necessary infrastructure is built. (5) To focus military-technical policy efforts on the 
provision of high-quality equipment, and on growth in the combat efficiency of the Armed Forces and other 
troops. The eventual purpose of military reform is to build sufficient defenses and qualitatively new Armed 
Forces and other troops, which would be fitted out with up-to-date military equipment and boast high 
professional skill. Pavel Felgenhauer, Russian Military Reform: Ten Years of Failure. 
99 Pavel Baev, Putin’s Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency. 
100 Ibid. 
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of the Strategic Missile Forces, Space Forces, Air Forces and the Air Defense Forces 
under one command. While not all of the proposals were enacted, many did occur. Many 
Hollow ‘cadre’ divisions were eliminated while a small number of ‘permanent readiness’ 
divisions were created. Moderate structural reforms, such as the merger of the air defense 
and air forces, as well as, the reduction in the number of military educational institutions, 
were also pushed through. Some reform measures were taking place, but larger issues 
were being ignored. In order for Yeltsin to move forward with practical reform measures, 
base closures and deep personnel cuts had to be addressed, but were not.  
Boris Yeltsin often stressed that “the threat of a large-scale war of aggression 
against Russia is from the sphere of fantasy,” due to the nuclear threat held by Russia.101 
However, Yeltsin stated his concern that a new ‘cordon sanitaire’ on Russia’s western 
front could occur. “This statement appears to set the basis for real military reform: to 
build and preserve a Russian force capable of deterring unfriendly NATO forces with 
nuclear weapons, according to Pavel Felgenhauer, the Defense and National Security 
editor of the Svedonya newspaper in Moscow.”102 However, it was well known the 
military’s problems stemmed from the poor economy, corruption and theft. The Minister 
of Defense Igor Sergeyev made some very interesting remarks on May 23, 1997 “We are 
realists”, “We will proceed on those funds which the country is in a position today and 
tomorrow to allocate to defense.”103 The goal was to raise the qualitative level in 
equipment and supplies and for the social status of servicemen. “In fact the reform of the 
armed forces should have begun five or six years ago, Sergeyev argued.”104 His 
statements struck at the heart of the matter concerning reform. Sergeyev had to deal with 
the many disputes between the service chiefs. The disputes were resolved in the Security 
Council and in 1998 Boris Yeltsin signed “The Basis (Concept) Of The State Policy Of 
The Russian Federation On Military Construction Through The Year 2005.” The policy 
                                                 
101 Major General, Retired, Valentin Rog, “National Security Concept Critique,” Morskoy Sbornik , 01 
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laid out clear lines of authority, which put an end to interdepartmental quarrels.105 It 
appeared suitable changes were occurring in the military reform process and were noted 
from various sources. 
Vice Admiral Mikhail Zakharenko, Pacific Fleet Chief of Staff, noted positive 
changes in July 1997, changes that flowed from the 1st realistic reform in the Navy. 
Admiral Zakharenko viewed non-standard thinking as a requirement to motivate 
personnel to adapt to the economic situation. However, Admiral Zakharenko noted the 
numerous problems in the reform measures being enacted.106 
In August 1998, just as some reform measures had taken a step in the right 
direction, albeit a minor one, an economic crash stymied further measures.107 At that 
point, the money the navy had counted on for reforms became worthless. Reform debates 
commenced again with military specialists believing that no effective measure for 
carrying out the reforms existed. Once a decision was made it was not adequately 
followed up. The naval leadership made decisions that failed to take account of Russia’s 
fragile economy. As a result, navy morale plummeted. In September 2000, the 
Commander of the VARYAG, noted the following: 
• A brand new lieutenant receives only 1600 rubles and sea pay and for the 
first five years on a ship an officer is only entitled to service quarters. 
• Medical commissariats send ill personnel; therefore dozen of sailors must 
be written off from call up alone. 
• Some seaman are sent utilizing youth travel passes which saves money so 
thank you letters are sent to parents and city leaders.  
• Some seamen do not know how to brush their teeth. 
                                                 
105 Ibid, p. 2.  
106 Concerns for naval commanders were as follows: (1) Ships must go to sea, but increased financing 
should not be expected. (2) Officers are not able to feed their families, but are working to maintain their 
ships. (3) It is becoming more and more difficult to make it to the CO’s chair because a reduction in the 
number of ships has frozen promotion. (4) Warrant officers cannot meet the needs of the demands placed 
on them. (5) Industry that used to support the ships is falling apart. (6) New ships are coming to the fleet, 
however they are not in the numbers needed.  
107 The Russian ruble became suspect, similar to many Asian currencies, due to the default by the 
Russian Federation regarding its debt, which caused the eventual economic downturn. 
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• Sea time limited due to no fuel, therefore a typical underway period is 
twenty-four hours. 
• Low educational levels of new recruits are disturbing.108 
Personnel and commanders live on hopes for more funding and a greater attention 
to the navy. Documents now in circulation addressing concepts for future security in the 
Russian Federation may be the ‘medicine the doctor ordered’ for the navy. Appendix 
B.109 displays a breakdown of naval forces since the beginning of reforms. If followed 
and implemented the ‘Russian Naval Policy’110 and the ‘World Ocean’111 concepts may 
                                                 
108 Captain First Rank, Sergey Moyseyev and K. Lobkov, “Commanding Officer of Pacflt Flagship, 
Varyag, Discusses Morale,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 September 2000, reported and translated by Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, 28 September 2000, FTS20000928000321, p. 1. 
109 Rear-Admiral (retired) Radiy Anatolyevich Zubkov, “R-Adm Zubkov on State of Russian Navy,” 
Morskoy Sbornik, 01 January 1996, reported and translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 
March 1997, FTS19970328000664, p. 2. 
110 The new naval policy has been broken down by Admiral V Kravchenko and appears appropriately 
to address the financial realities in the Russian Federation. The grandiose goal of rivaling the US Navy 
appears to be a thing of the past. The goals and stages presented appear to be realistic, however the doctrine 
has not been ratified. Once again the importance of the Navy is in question.  The main goals, stages and 
assurances for the policy are as follows: 
Goals the Navy feels it needs to meet: (1) Protect Russian sea borders. (2) Restrain the process of 
weakening naval potential. (3) Coordinate state regulation problems in ship construction  
Stages that need to be met: (1) By 2002, develop priorities for the Navy’s next 5-10 years. (2) From 
2003-2007, Stabilize Russia’s status of a sea power and the security in adjacent waters. (3) By 2007, 
Stabilize Russia’s status of a sea power and invigorate economics by exploiting the world’s oceans. (4) By 
2020, Begin massive rearming and replace the existing fleet. 
The new Russian naval policy ensures: (1) Strategic nuclear deterrence will be maintained. (2) Deter 
individuals or coalitions from attacking Russia. (3) Defense of the state will occur from the sea and ocean 
directions will occur if attacked. (4) Helping border troops by guarding the underwater environment. 
M. Mostak, “Northern Fleet Exercise Assessed,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 July 1999, reported and translated by 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 September 1999, FTS19990928001681, p. 1. 
111 The World Ocean concept paper was implemented with a Presidential Decree in January 1997, due 
to Russia’s curtailment of oceanographic activities. “ The program is aimed at a comprehensive solution of 
the problem of exploration and effective use of the World Ocean in the interests of economic development 
and provision for the national security of the country.” Therefore, the main point of the paper is to stop the 
decline of Russian maritime activities abroad. The concept provides the Navy with the ammunition it 
requires to restore its prominence by not allowing a military-technological lag behind developed countries. 
The unification of all ministries for naval development is seen as important for adequate development. 
Therefore, the Navy must become less burdensome for the country and protect Russia’s national interests in 
the world’s oceans.  
Atlantic: Rich in mineral resources and seafood, avenue for economic cooperation. 
Pacific: Continental shelf, seafood, marine animals, minerals and deep-water ports, avenue for 
economic cooperation.  
Artic: Deep water ports, only open exit to the Atlantic for Russia, large deposits of oil, coal, gas, iron 
ore, and poly metals, seafood, fresh water fish and quickest route to the Far East. 
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once again be the impetus that has been required for adequate reform during President 
Putin’s tenure in office. 
E. PUTIN’S MILITARY REFORMS 
Waste and mismanagement has been a characteristic of the Russian Military since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Increased military spending is being seen as throwing 
money into the fire, because previous reform measures have not taken shape. Many of 
President Putin’s specific reform measures for the Navy are presented in Chapter V. 
President Putin appears poised to be the first true glimmer of hope for the military, but he 
must ensure his reform measures do not fail as past presidents have. However, proper 
reform measures may be difficult because his arrival to power was directly linked to the 
problem of the build-up and use of military power.112 However, similar to Yeltsin, 
President Putin was not eager to rapidly implement military reform measures during his 
early tenure in office. The military leadership opposed drastic reform measures and the 
issue did not provide him with “votes” required for election into office. His willingness to 
place military reform on the ‘backburner’ was seen best during his ‘conceptual’ address 
in July 2000 to parliament, when the issue of military reform was neglected.113 Every 
military leader in the world wants to increase the resources and prestige of his/her 
country’s military forces, and Putin is no different.  
Moscow does not have the capital required to rebuild its Cold War force structure. 
Clear and concise reform will be the only avenue available to President Putin; therefore 
the force structure for Russia in the future must be a smaller state-of-the-art force. “As 
experts see it, the best outcome for Russia would be the emergence of a smaller, more 
modern fighting force shaped to deal with border incursions and internal disputes, 
according to Stuart Powell, who is the White House correspondent for Hearst 
                                                 
Indian: Large reserves of marine mineral and biological resources, expansion of economic cooperation 
(Iraq, Yemen, Mozambique, Ethiopia, etc…). 
Baltic, Black, Caspian and Med:  Short lines of communications to Africa, Near and Middle East, 
Northern Med, economic possibilities, ice free seaports, oil in the Caspian sea. 
The World Ocean [Paper on-line] [Decree #11 of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 1997] 
(accessed 12 August 2001); available from 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/CDONEW22.htm; Internet. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Pavel Baev, Putin’s Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency. 
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Newspapers.”114 If the continental focus is the leading case, then the Navy will find it 
difficult to garner any support for its reform measures. The naval leadership is hoping to 
catch the attention of the native St Petersburger, President Putin, while utilizing the 
debacle of the KURSK accident to push for desired naval reforms. However, Putin has 
warned, “the structure of the armed forces must precisely correspond to the threats Russia 
faces now and will face in the future. To maintain such a cumbersome and at times 
ineffective military organization is extravagant. In our situation, it’s simply 
impermissible.”115 This point was addressed again in President Putin’s June speech to 
graduates in Russia’s military academies, “We are paying special attention to military 
construction and military reform. The unique geopolitical location of Russia, its vast 
territory and long borders present great demands before defenders of the homeland.” 
President Putin understands the immense size and structure of the military must be 
addressed and he has enacted upon reducing some of the ‘bloat’.  
 It should be noted that the Russian Federation has drastically cut its military 
forces from four million to 1.2 million, while the Navy has diminished its force size from 
450,000 to 180,000 men.116  As Dr Alexi Arbatov has stated many times, the Russian 
Federation must decide between a qualitative or a quantitative armed force structure, 
because it can not afford to do both. In September 2000, President Putin ordered a three-
year reduction to cut another 350,000 personnel and maintain a force structure of 
850,000.117 The Army is projected to receive the deepest cuts. But the Navy will also 
lose 50,000 personnel. The ultimate goal in the proposed personnel reductions is to free 
funds for fuel, spare parts, maintenance and training.118 The downsizing of the armed 
forces is a step in the right direction. But it has been prepared without any reflection on 
                                                 
114 Stewart Powell, Russia’s Military Retrenchment [magazine article on-line] [Air Force Magazine, 
August 2001] (accessed 06 August 2001); available from 
http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2001/s20010806russias.htm; Internet. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Current military personnel breakdown: 1.2 million servicemen; 800,000 civilians serving in the 
armed forces; and 1 million civilians serving in ‘other’ agencies, such as interior troops, border guards and 
special construction troops. Putin is committed to a reduction of 600,000 personnel by 2004. Servicemen 
would decrease to 865,000; civilians would decrease to 670,000 and ‘others’ would decrease to 900,000. 
Rear-Admiral (retired) Radiy Anatolyevich Zubkov, “R-Adm Zubkov on State of Russian Navy.” 
117 The force will be 20% as large as the force structure in the Cold War. 
118 Stewart Powell, Russia’s Military Retrenchment. 
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the mission or structure of the Russian military.119 Therefore, it will be difficult to 
maintain a strong foreign policy in the Asian-Pacific region with cuts this deep for the 
Navy.  
Tackling the issue of the ‘bloat’ in the military is just one focus for President 
Putin. He also wants to increase the professionalism in the military. It has been reported 
that President Putin earned nearly ninety percent of the military vote in his last election 
due to his pledge to eliminate the draft. Putin’s goals are to reduce the years of neglect 
and ensure that missed paydays, food shortages, brutal hazing, and corrupt moonlighting 
become things of the past.120 In his view, the shift to an all-volunteer force offers the 
only valid path to future improvements. More recently, the issue of military reform 
appears to be attaining a higher priority on President Putin’s agenda. The catalyst for 
current reform measures was the sinking of the KURSK and the Ostankino tower fire, 
both of which showcased Russia’s dilapidated military infrastructure. 
The appointment of Sergei Ivanov as the new Minister of Defense in March 2001 
could provide the impetus towards serious and sustained reform efforts. In January 2001, 
President Putin signed a package of documents regarding reform in the military that was 
generated by the Security Council and the General Staff. “The documents are supposed to 
elaborate the basic decisions taken during the series of meetings of the Security Council 
during autumn 2000.”121 However, various proposals for military reform continue to be 
debated. First, the Yabloko Party122 proposes wide cuts in the military forces. This is 
countered by the Communist Party, which advocates a Soviet style army structure half 
the size of Cold War levels and to spend more resources building against NATO 
enlargement. Third, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy places a greater emphasis 
                                                 
119 Victoria Levin, “Prospects for Military Reform in Russia,” [paper on-line] [Carnegie Endowment] 
(accessed on 14 August 2001); available from 
http://www.ceip.org/files/events/trenin.asp?pr=2&EventID=249; Internet. 
120 Stewart Powell, Russia’s Military Retrenchment. 
121 Pavel Baev, Putin’s Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency. 
122 Yabloko (apple) was a political party formed in 1993 as opposition to the method of reforming 
Russia’s economy by President Yeltsin. The party has the intention of making life “normal” by 
consolidating the statehood of Russia in a consistent democracy without using violence and extraordinary 
solutions. All-Russia Public Political Organization Yabloko [Yabloko Party website on-line] (accessed on 
14 August 2001); available from http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Programme/Docs/Yabloko.html; Internet. 
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on restoring the ties between the Armed Forces and the Defense industries.123 The task to 
address each of the separate proposals has fallen upon the Security Council. While 
Ivanov’s appointment is seen as a positive step for military reform, numerous problems 
remain. It appears probable that many crucial issues will not be properly addressed due to 
the political infighting, which can only be resolved by President Putin. 
The President of the Russian Federation will be the only person who can control 
the political infighting and implement proper reform measures. “A real reform can only 
be a presidential initiative, executed by a committed team of reformers with sufficient 
political support under constant financial supervision, Baev argues.”124 The political 
strength of Putin allows him to be in the position to enact clear and concise military 
reforms, but even he has said that reforms could take a decade or longer for full 
implementation.125 Therefore, Russia must still contend with the burden of a massive and 
unreformed defense-industrial complex that employs two million people and presents a 
formidable “obstacle on Russia’s road towards more functional, market-oriented 
economy.”126 Only if the economy maintains its current positive growth rate, will reform 
measures have the capability to be performed. Yet to be seen is whether Putin’s 
determination will be enough to bring about the changes in attitude and organization that 
everyone agrees will be needed.127  
F. CONCLUSION 
The attempts at military reform by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were 
minimalist at best and only concerned the economy. One can only speculate as to the 
reform measures President Putin will enact. Initially, he has embarked on strategy of 
reduction similar to that of President Yeltsin. The reality is reform measures in the 
Russian Federation have only amounted to further cuts in the military forces and few 
modern organizational changes. Low pay and poor discipline continue to diminish the 
effectiveness of the forces. The draft is a major problem and violence still occurs in the 
                                                 
123 Pavel Baev, Putin’s Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency. 
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125 Stewart Powell, Russia’s Military Retrenchment. 
126 Victoria Levin, “Prospects for Military Reform in Russia.” 
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ranks. Roughly 70% of defense spending today is for personnel and maintenance. “There 
has been a remarkable lack of progress in most areas of military reform and that fact in 
itself is news,” says Terence Taylor, IISS Assistant Director. “I suspect the armed forces 
will be able to get their share of the defense budget, but whether that will enhance the 
situation is doubtful.”128 Reform measures appear to be moving forward. However the 
desire and speed of reforms is in doubt. The numerous attempts for reform in the Russian 
Navy have failed and will continue to fail because they have not been properly 
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IV. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC REGION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the Russian Federation’s foreign policy in the Western 
Pacific Region. Russia has little to offer regional powers such as Japan, Korea or even 
Vietnam. Despite assurances by President Putin that the Western Pacific will be a 
primary focus of Russia’s interests, the loss of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam (in 2004) 
exemplified the Russian Federation’s decline as a naval power. China, too, has 
recognized the Russian Federation’s current weakness. In fact, Russia’s weakness has 
brought the two powers closer together to coordinate their military priorities, diplomacy 
and arms transfer policies to check what they see as U.S. hegemony in the Western 
Pacific. But, at the same time, Putin swings between pro and anti-U.S. stances. Without a 
credible long-term vision for the Pacific, or a means to carry out a forward policy there, 
Putin’s policies continue to be opportunistic.  
B. LITTLE TO OFFER 
Moscow has little to offer regional powers in the Asia-Pacific region. The Russian 
Federation will not be viewed as a major player in the Pacific Region until their 
economic system fully converts to a market economy. Even with the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has been unable to fully convert to the “open” 
international market.  
In 1993, the Tokyo Declaration was signed during President Boris Yeltsin’s trip 
and has been the cornerstone for the development of bilateral relations. Japan’s sole 
fundamental policy towards Russia is to resolve the issue of the ‘Northern Territories’129 
by 2000, which would conclude with a peace treaty and fully normalize relations between 
the two countries. Obviously the issue of the ‘Northern Territories’ has not been 
concluded, but progress has been seen in political, economic, security issues. The two 
countries have exchanged port visits, as Japan does not wish to alienate Russia militarily. 
Japan has readjusted its naval force structure to deal with a broader range of defense 
contingencies and shifted away from its former preoccupation with the Soviet threat. 
                                                 
129 The Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islands administered by Russia since 1945, but 
claimed by Japan. 
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Russia has nothing to offer Japan diplomatically or militarily beyond the resolution of the 
‘Northern Territories’ issue. In fact, it is Japan that is assisting Russia by aiding Russian 
submarine decommissioning through technology and equipment transfers, as well as 
financial support. For example, from 1994-1999, Japan disbursed $100 million and June 
1999 announced an additional $200 million contribution for submarine decommissioning 
and plutonium disposition.130 Finally, in February 1997, the United States, Japan and 
Korea embarked upon ‘Trilateral Naval Cooperation’ due to the evolving security 
environment in Northeast Asia. 
Trade agreements and human rights issues constitute the major diplomatic 
concerns between Russia and Korea. On 15 May 2001, the fifth round of working-level 
talks for the coordination of defense policy occurred between the Russian and Korean 
ministries of defense. Discussions focused on bilateral exchanges of military personnel 
and the promotion of mutual cooperation. The fact that these talks are occurring is 
encouraging. But, as with Japan, the U.S. military presence is the dominant force in 
Korea. The United States has seven installations in Korea, including one naval facility 
(Chinhae Fleet Activities). The majority of the Republic of Korea Navy’s (ROKN) ships 
are small craft. Hence, the operational capability for ‘blue-water’ operations is limited, so 
that cooperation with the U.S. Navy has occurred since the cessation of hostilities on the 
peninsula in the 1953. Moscow simply cannot provide the same forward presence as the 
United States Seventh Fleet.  
Furthermore, Moscow’s backing of Pyongyang over the years has left a bitter 
taste in Seoul’s mouth. North Korea has requested that Russia provide a number of high-
tech weapons, including ground-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft radar navigation systems, 
large warships, and advanced T-90 tanks. However, Sergei Ivanov, the Russian 
Federation Defense Minister, said the defense cooperation between the two countries 
would mainly involve spare parts for North Korea’s aging military equipment. Ivanov 
said the arms trade with the North would be of a nature and scope that will not 
compromise stability on the Korean Peninsula.131 
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131 Jang-Jin Hwang, “Russia, N.K. Make Progress on High-tech Weapons Trade,” Korea Herald, 31 
July 2001.  
Relations with Vietnam, so close during the Vietnam War, have grown more 
distant since 1989. The Soviet Union had a number of overseas naval bases, but Cam 
Ranh Bay was pivotal for the Pacific Fleet. Cam Ranh Bay has two 10,000 feet runways 
and is an excellent deep-water port. The bay provides a relatively secure position; hence 
it is the site of large munitions and Petroleum/Oil/Lubricants storage sites. The stationing 
of Soviet air and naval forces began in 1978 with the establishment of the Soviet-
Vietnamese alliance. During the 1980s, the Soviet military role in Vietnam increased as 
Moscow provided Hanoi with weapons and equipment. In return, the Soviet Navy 
benefited from harbor access at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, while reconnaissance 
aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. Since 1989, Russian combat troops have 
been withdrawn from Cam Ranh Bay, and only a few auxiliary vessels remain.  
In 1993, Moscow and Hanoi signed a ten-year contract that ensured the continued 
use of signal intelligence facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. The government of Vietnam did not 
extend the lease on Russia’s sole military base in Southeast Asia beyond 2003, claiming 
they required the port for civilian economic development. Therefore, from 2004, Russia 
will have no signal intelligence coverage of the South China Sea. The importance of the 
facility to the intelligence community is immeasurable and will be difficult to replace. 
The Russian Federation’s diminishing position in the Asia-Pacific region is evident in the 
loss of use of the facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.  
Relations with China are improving and the goal is to increase the military sphere 
of cooperation with neighboring countries in the Pacific region. However, the scope of 
military contacts with these countries has been limited, in part because the Russian 
Pacific Fleet is unable to dispatch more than one squadron of ships in the Russian Pacific 
Fleet.* The only ‘trump cards’ available to Moscow are its nuclear weapons capability 
and high-tech weapons systems. 132 The nuclear capability ensures countries in the region 
                                                 
* Chapter V provides a greater emphasis regarding the lack of deployments and exercises conducted by 
the Russian Pacific Fleet. 
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132 The Russian Pacific Fleet has increased its nuclear exercise frequency in the past few years. The 
recognition of how much more powerful the U.S. Navy’s hold on maritime dominance is has produced a 
chilling realization concerning the use of nuclear weapons. “[A number of people] in the Russian military 
have publicly speculated in writing that the use by the Russian Navy of a tactical nuclear weapon against a 
US fleet carrier battle group (CVBG) would not really constitute nuclear war.” The outcome of recent 
exercises in the Pacific region has led Russian planners to conclude that nuclear weapons are the only 
means to check an aggressive U.S. advance. Subsequently, simulated nuclear launches were conducted off 
will not ignore Moscow, but it is only a matter of time before Russia losses its advantage 
in high-tech weapons systems. “Russia and China share the same objective: They want to 
constrain United States military power,” according to Bao Shifen, a scholar at the 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies. 133 China sees the Russian Federation as the 
only country that can compete with the United States as a nuclear power. While this 
remains true with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the Russian Pacific Fleet may lose 
its strategic submarine capabilities, thereby diminishing any military dominance Moscow 
may claim in the Asia Pacific region. 
C. THE CHINA CARD 
President Vladimir Putin is well aware of his weakness at home. Since the 
beginning of his presidency, he had been concerned with the conflict in Chechnya, 
quarrels with Russia’s oligarchs and NATO’s eastward expansion. All of these concerns 
have caused Putin to strengthen ties with the PRC. In June 2001 President Putin, prior to 
meeting President George W. Bush, traveled to Shanghai to set up a regional cooperation 
semi-alliance with President Jiang Zemin and the rest of the Shanghai Cooperation. The 
diplomatic and military priorities approach has provided Moscow leverage in the Asia-
Pacific region. Leverage has also been attained with arms sales between Russia and 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically China. Moscow views these ties as 
providing the ability to maintain a voice in regional affairs and as collateral to discourage 
China from invading the Russian Far East with Chinese immigrants.  
What do the Chinese seek from Russia and Vladimir Putin in return? Beijing 
wants President Putin to strengthen control of the Central Asian regions to discourage 
Islamic-inspired separatism there, as well as to provide high-tech equipment for China. 
Russia is eager to retain what is left of its far-flung empire to slow, and eventually 
reverse, Moscow’s declining influence in the Far East. Moscow will be able to continue 
                                                 
the coast of Alaska. This results in a departure from Soviet policy. Since 1958, Soviet President Nikita 
Khrushchev, who flatly refused to risk nuclear confrontation with the U.S. over Taiwan, devised the 
nuclear policy for the Soviet Union. Yung, Christopher, Kim Soo Chang, Wie, Hwan Sue and Ishizu, 
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133 Andrew Higgins, “Russia Courts China in an Effort to Constrain U.S. before Summit,” Wall Street 
Journal, 15 June 2001.  
60 
focusing on reasserting control over the oil-rich lands around the Caspian Sea and the 
pipeline routes to the West by maintaining stability in the border regions. President Putin 
can then make the claim to Russian nationalists that he saved this part of the extended 
empire; if Chinese-Russian and Russian-Japanese border negotiations can be delayed 
indefinitely.134 
1. Military Priorities 
The military budget for the Russian Federation was increased in 2001 by 50 
percent to $7.9 billion, and the provisional budget for 2002 includes another 20 percent 
increase to $9.5 billion. Moscow has moved to boost investments in military projects, 
with a significant portion going to the navy. The goal to secure Russia’s maritime 
frontiers and influence global maritime operations continues to be echoed. Even greater 
emphasis is placed by Moscow on ballistic missile submarines as Russia’s most 
important nuclear strategic deterrent. In 2000, President Putin approved a ‘roadmap’ that 
calls for building new naval fleet ‘flagships’ over the next five years with successive 
production to be completed by 2010, and a total rearmament by 2020. Russian Navy 
commander-in-chief Vladimir Kuroyedov recently told reporters in St Petersburg that 
“Russia is making a step toward the realization that it is a naval power,” according to 
ITAR-TASS. If this were true, a re-emergence of the Russian Navy in the Asia-Pacific 
region would have widespread implications, fueling naval arms races already underway 
in Asia between China, South Korea, Japan and others. And, the influence Russia desires 
in the region would possibly be attained. However, even with this impressive 
propaganda, the state of the Russian Navy remains dismal: only 40 percent to 60 percent 
of personnel are able to fulfill their assignments due to aging and inoperable ships and 
equipment. It is far more likely that Russia’s Navy will dwindle to fewer than 60 ships in 
a little more than a decade.135 
Moscow has also stated plans to create a pair of high-readiness joint force groups 
by 2006. One group will be based in Southwestern Asia and one in Central Asia. “These 
forces will be the first to receive new weapons systems,” says Oksana Antonenko, a 
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research fellow for the Institute for International Studies.136 And, the priority for 
equipment modernization will be given to air force and missile air defense, 
communications, reconnaissance systems, and precision weapons.  It should be noted that 
no mention has been made regarding the recreation of a naval squadron for Southeastern 
Asia has been mentioned. How can the Russian Navy or the Russian Pacific Fleet be 
taken seriously when Russia’s meager defense priorities are being focused on other 
services? As stated earlier, Russia is a continental power and the naval leadership will not 
easily divert this focus. 
2. Diplomacy 
Moscow and Beijing have already demonstrated an ability to cooperate to defeat 
U.S. diplomatic initiatives, as was seen in the defeat of the United States proposal for 
“smart sanctions” against Iraq. First, China extracted economic concessions from 
Washington in return for not using its veto in the United Nations Security Council to stop 
the United States plan. Then Russia stepped in with a veto. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between 
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China offer two examples of 
Russian Federation /People’s Republic of China agreement to thwart the United States, 
Taiwan provides a third area of cooperation. 
a.  Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
On June 15 2001, the Presidents of China, Russia and four former Soviet 
Central Asian republics established a political-military coalition called, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO).137 The organization was formed to promote mutual 
trust, good-neighborly and friendly relations between the member states and strengthen 
regional security and stability by promoting joint development. Chinese President Zemin 
stated that the six countries had agreed upon political, military and intelligence 
cooperation for the purpose of “cracking down on terrorism, separatism, extremism” and 
                                                 
136 The Kremlin wants to tackle long-festering problems, and painful reform can’t be avoided much 
longer. Stewart Powell, Russia’s Military Retrenchment [magazine article on-line] [Air Force Magazine, 
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to maintain “regional security.” Specifically, Moscow and Beijing view the SCO as a 
means to combat twin evils: Islamic militancy in Central Asia and U.S. hegemony 
throughout the world. 
The political significance of the current ‘association’ is not as great as 
Moscow would like. Also, the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States have led 
to an increase in America’s role in Central Asia.138 However, both countries realize the 
advantage of “soft” influence gained through the political and economic means. The SCO 
is taking on a regional dimension. The six countries involved in the SCO cover 30 million 
square kilometers, 60 percent of continental Europe and Asia and have a combined 
population of 1.5 billion. President Putin is ‘grasping for straws’ in the Far East, willing 
to use almost any means to salvage Russia’s prestige as a superpower.139 
b. Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between 
the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China 
On 16 July 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin signed a treaty of cooperation in Moscow. The treaty brings the countries 
together for the next 20 years and commits them jointly to oppose a majority of the 
framework for international security that the United States has been seeking to impose 
since the end of the Cold War. The treaty is officially called the Treaty on Good 
Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s 
Republic of China.140 One Russian commentator in Moscow described the treaty as “an 
act of friendship against America.” The pact says that Russia and China will “uphold the 
strict observance of generally recognized principles and norms of international law 
against any actions aimed at exerting pressure or interfering, under any pretext, with the 
internal affairs of sovereign states.”  
                                                 
138 The 11 September 2001 incident refers to the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and 
Pennsylvania.  
139 Mahmud, Khalid Mahmud, “Beginning of a new alliance,” [paper on-line] [DAWN]; (accessed on 
19 October 2001), available from http://www.dawn.com/2001/08/29/op.htm; Internet. 
140 The treaty is composed of 25 articles and formally opposes the United States missile plans, and 
places Russia more firmly behind China’s claim of sovereignty over the island of Taiwan. It also 
strengthens military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow while rejecting the intervention in the 
Balkans by NATO. Also, the treaty stipulates a further reduction of military forces in the border regions, an 
arrangement to fight terrorism and drug trafficking, work to resolve the final disputes along the 2,250 mile 
border and prevent groups or a country from using the territory of one against the other. 
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The treaty is the first such agreement between the two countries since Mao 
Tse-tung and Joseph Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. Although the treaty 
states that it “is not aimed at any third country,” it does seek to promote a “new 
international order.”141 The five key areas of cooperation are: (1) Joint actions to offset a 
perceived U.S. hegemony; (2) Demarcation of the two countries’ long disputed 4,300 
kilometer border; (3) Arms sales and technology transfers; (4) Supply of energy and raw 
materials; (5) Cooperation to combat the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia. The goal 
is to divide America from its allies. Nor is Vladimir Putin, who served in the KGB 
between 1975 and 1991, above using covert means to achieve that goal. The treaty could 
provide the impetus Moscow has been searching for to further regain its standing as 
world power.  
Since 2000, the leaders of the two countries have met over eight times to 
coordinate their “work together to preserve the global strategic balance.” Although 
Europe and the United States should take this Sino-Russian rapprochement seriously, 
contradictions in political objectives remain between Moscow and Beijing. Foremost 
among them is Russia’s ‘primordial distrust’ of the Chinese, according to Dr. James 
Sherr of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.142 Another important goal of the 
treaty is to increase sales from the Russian, oil, gas, nuclear and armaments industries.143 
Although Russia may now be more ideologically aligned with China, its major trade 
remains with the United States. Neither Moscow nor Beijing wants to forfeit the 
economic benefits of trade with the United States, which is much greater than their 
interchange with each other.144 
                                                 
141 Constantine C. Menges, “Russia, China and What’s Really on the Table,” [newspaper article- 
online] [Washington Post 29 July 2001 Page B02] (accessed on 17 October 2001); available from 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A64193-2001Jul28?language=printer; Internet. Menges is a 
senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and was special assistant for security and national affairs to President 
Reagan.  
142 Cohen, Ariel, “The Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty: A Strategic Shift in 
Eurasia?,” [paper on-line] [The Heritage Foundation] (accessed on 19 October 2001); available from 
http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1459.html; Internet. 
143 Tyler, Patrick E, “Russia and China Sign ‘Friendship’ Pact,” New York Times, 17 July 
2001.Patrick E. Tyler, “Russia and China Sign ‘Friendship’ Pact,” New York Times, 17 July 2001. 
144 Trade between China-U.S. $115 billion; between Russia-China $10 billion; Russia-U.S. $11 
billion. 
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 c. Taiwan 
Moscow is searching for any means to disrupt or prevent the perceived 
U.S. hegemony in the world. Hence, the first Sino-Russian cooperation agreement since 
the end of the Cold War, and the first regarding Taiwan, was announced in 1999 between 
Admiral Zakharenko and Colonel General Zhang Wannian. The “Friendship Treaty” 
states that, “The government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate 
government representing the whole of China” and “Taiwan is an integral part of China.” 
Evidence of the potential new military risks to Washington and its allies came this past 
February prior to the signing of the Friendship Treaty, in the form of Russian military 
exercises that included large-scale simulated nuclear and conventional attacks against 
United States military units “opposing” a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.145 In July 2000, 
according to reports from Hong Kong Sing Tao newspaper, Vladimir Putin told Jiang 
Zemin that, in the event of a conflict between China and Taiwan, he had ordered the 
Russian Pacific Fleet to block any intervention by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.146 
Moscow believes that it can increase its world standing by flexing its 
military muscle, specifically the Russian Pacific Fleet, in the Far East against the United 
States. However, the Russian Pacific Fleet no longer possesses the capability to contend 
with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, even in conjunction with the PLAN. Therefore, the only 
means available to counter the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be nuclear war with the United 
States for the sake of Chinese interests in Taiwan. Therefore, the only conclusion to draw 
is that the Russian Federation does not have the capability to thwart a U.S. assault on 
Taiwan. It would limit its actions to diplomatic protests or perhaps a token naval sortie in 
the northern Pacific, which is unlikely. 
3. Arms Trade 
The Soviet economy was a command-based economy centered on the defense 
industry. The majority of arms sales by the Soviet Union during the Cold War period 
were not advanced technology weapons. This is not to say that the Soviet Union did not 
have advanced technology weapons. Rather, the Soviets did not export their top of the 
                                                 
145 Constantine C. Menges, “Russia, China and What’s Really on the Table.” 
146 “Russian Fleet Will Intercept U.S. 7th Fleet’s Intervention in Cross-Strait War,” Hong Kong Sing 
Tao Jih Pao, 8 July 2000, reported and translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 8 July 
2000, CPP 20000708000004. 
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line weapons systems. For example, in the 1980s, many weapons sold abroad were 
designed and produced in the 1950-70s. The decrease in national defense budgets 
throughout the world has significantly affected defense procurements. In Russia, defense 
procurement has declined by 80 percent since 1990.147 The survival of many defense 
firms is directly tied to arms sales abroad. Hence, countries look to procure advanced 
conventional arms based on modern 1980-90s technology, and some of this technology is 
now being exported. The defense industry in Russia is full of expertise and advanced 
weapon design, but lacks the necessary demand from its impoverished military.148 Many 
defense firms have received subsidies, but the only real source of income for the industry 
is exports.*  
President Vladimir Putin is actively pursuing a restructuring of the defense sector. 
Russian leaders view the export of conventional weapons, and in particular, Military-
Technical Cooperation as a possible savior for the defense industry.150 Since 1991, 
Russian military exports have become a primary means to diminish the economic burden 
of military spending and ensure the effectiveness of defense industries as the core of 
Russia’s defense potential.151 President Putin stated that, “It is the military industrial 
complex that can help Russia out of all the problems the country is facing. The 
government considers [the defense industry] a priority sector of the Russian economy, 
and the sphere of accumulating the most advanced technologies and highly skilled 
                                                 
147 Andrew Hull and David Markov, “A Changing Market in the Arms Bazaar,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review 1 March 1997, p. 140. 
148 If a fiscal crisis occurs again, the possibility for the transfer of even greater technologically 
advanced systems exists. For example, the Komsomol’sk shipyard attempted to sell the NERPA (Akula-II 
class) and an unnamed Akula-II class submarine, to India and China in 1999, but the government halted the 
unauthorized effort. Even with the growing economy the Akula series (Projects 971 and 971U) is at a 
standstill; one of these, the DRAKON, actually was completed in July 1995 for the Pacific Fleet but has yet 
to be delivered because of the debt still owed the shipyard. A. D. Baker III ed., “World Navies in Review,” 
[magazine article on-line] [Proceedings: Combat Fleets of the World (March 2000)] (accessed on 17 
October 2001); available from http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/PRObaker.htm#europe; 
Internet. 
* Some of the advanced weapon systems sold abroad are discussed in Chapter V Table 5.1.149 
150 Mostly concerned with arms imports and exports, but also, includes the provision of military 
technical services, free or preferential aide, manufacturing licenses, and cooperation with other nations in 
the development of arms and military equipment. 
151 A. J. Pierre and Dmitri Trenin,  “Russia in the World Arms Trade,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1997, p. 22.  
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personnel.”152 One of the first steps taken by President Putin was the restructuring of the 
defense industry in February 2000 with the creation of the Russian Conventional 
Weapons Agency.153 However, the restructuring has not taken full effect and the 
transition to a market economy has forced the remaining defense industry companies to 
sell their products abroad in order to remain solvent. 
India and China have welcomed Russian firms with open arms, and between them 
constitute about half of Russia’s total arms purchases. The thesis will only examine the 
Chinese role in arms sales. The widespread conviction that quality is more important than 
quality has driven all the states in the Pacific region to seek the most modern and 
sophisticated weapons systems. In pursuit of its goal to become a world power, China has 
entered into a “strategic relationship” with Russia. The partnership provides hard cash to 
Russia in return for oil and advanced weapon systems. In the 1990s, China became the 
largest customer for the Russian defense industry by purchasing billions of dollars worth 
of aircraft, submarines, missiles and destroyers. Between 1991 and 1996, the Russian 
Federation sold China an estimated $1 billion (U.S. dollars) worth of military weapons 
and related technologies each year. From 1996-2001, the amount of arms sales doubled to 
$2 billion dollars. Currently, a five-year program is planned for $20 billion worth of 
military technology transfers to China.    
Russia has begun to sell some of it high-tech weapons systems abroad including 
the Sovremennyy class guided missile destroyer, Krivak class frigate, Kilo class 
submarine, Shkval “Squall” underwater rocket and the SS-N-22 “sunburn” missile. The 
selling of high-tech weapons could provide Moscow the leverage it desires by utilizing its 
                                                 
152 Russia plans to streamline its bloated defense sector by halving the number of weapons producers 
and consolidating the rest into big corporations capable of fighting for a larger share of the global arms 
market. Orders have slowed to a trickle and the sector is currently operating at less than 50% capacity. It is 
hoped that by combining forces, arms producers will be able to export more and use the increased earnings 
to finance research into new weapons systems. Guy Chazan, “Russia to Reduce Weapons Producers in a 
Bid to Streamline Defense Sector.” Wall Street Journal, 31 July 2001. And “Putin: Defense Industry Will 
Help Russia Out of Trouble,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 21 March 2000, reported and translated by the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, 21 March 2000, CEP20000321000180. 
153 The Russian Conventional Weapons Agency is a federal executive body, which effects executive, 
control, and licensing, regulatory and other functions. The agency will operate in the sphere of the 
conventional arms industry, including research, development, production, modernization and utilization of 
armored vehicles, firearms and artillery systems, missile systems, high-precision weapons, cartridges for 
firearms, optic and electronic devices and systems for weapons and civil equipment. “Putin Approves 
Statute of Conventional Weapons Agency,” Moscow ITAR-TASS, 2 February 2000, reported and translated 
by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 21 March 2000, 2 February 2000, FTS20000202001255. 
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navy in the Western Pacific. But, the Chinese already have a broad program in place to 
train military students, scientists and engineers and over 1,500 Russian scientists work in 
China’s design and production facilities. Therefore, the political leverage Moscow gains 
through its arms sales will prove to be a wasting asset. Eventually, Beijing will no longer 
need Russia’s expertise once it feels confident in its ability to train its personnel and 
reverse engineer high-tech equipment. Concerns of another fiscal crisis in Russia brought 
on by diminished oil sales could lead to further reductions in the Russian Pacific Fleet, 
and diminish any leverage it may hold.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Russia has little to offer countries in the Far East. The loss of Cam Ranh Bay, the 
only remaining overseas naval presence of a once great fleet, further highlights the 
Russian Federation’s decline. President Putin has attempted to portray the Western 
Pacific region as a primary focus of Russian foreign policy, but events in Europe and 
Central Asia have deflected those priorities, which thwarted his policies. China’s 
recognition of Moscow’s current weakness led to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and the July 2001 Friendship treaty. Of note, a senior Chinese official said candidly that 
the July 2001 treaty did not explicitly include military cooperation “because we have 
ample agreements on that issue.”154 Putin has said in July 2001 that the China-Russia 
treaty was President Jiang Zemin’s idea and it seems clear the Shanghai group was as 
well. Both are positioning themselves to define the rules under which the United States 
will be allowed to participate in the strategically important Central Asia and Western 
Pacific region. The reason for Russia to support China’s security interests and vice versa 
may lie in the fact that each country now views the other as a strategic backup. Russian 
leaders have often stated that the threats to Russia are NATO enlargement to the West 
and radical Islamic forces in Chechnya in the South. The only threat to Russia in the Far 
East is arguably a massive Chinese migration into Siberia. Hence, the only real common 
interests shared between the two countries are a fear of Islamic Fundamentalism and a 
reduction in the perceived U.S. hegemony. 
 
 
                                                 
154 Constantine C. Menges, “Russia, China and What’s Really on the Table.” 
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V. THE RUSSIAN NAVY TODAY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
On 31 December 1991, the Russian Federation was officially established as an 
independent state. On 7 May 1992, President Boris Yeltsin announced the creation of the 
Russian armed forces. Since 1992, the Russian Navy has suffered from under funding 
more than any other branch of the armed services. This under funding has diminished the 
capabilities, increased the limitations and reduced the environmental concerns of the 
Russian Navy. As a consequence, the Navy has reduced its focus from a blue-water to a 
littoral or coastal defense force.155 While this altered capability has been less important in 
the Baltic or Black Sea where Russia built its major interlocutors, the absence of a blue-
water Navy in the Pacific has severely impacted Russia’s ability to project power and 
influence. 
The structure and capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet will be discussed in 
greater detail. Historically, the Pacific Fleet has fluctuated from a piecemeal naval force 
to a premier naval power, depending on Russia’s political and the naval strength of other 
littoral powers interests. Russia’s lack of resources since 1990 has significantly decreased 
the size of the fleet. However, it should be noted many of the ships decommissioned 
since 1990 had already outlived their recommended life cycles, because scheduled 
overhauls and maintenance were never conducted. Therefore, many ships “aged” much 
faster than they would have with proper upkeep. Despite a decade of fiscal constraints, 
the Pacific Fleet is attempting once again to deploy ships to “show the flag” (Forward 
Presence), and to conduct naval exercises with the goal of increasing crew proficiency 
and demonstrating capabilities. However, these deployments and exercises are few and 
far between. Currently the Russian Navy does not have sufficient capabilities to support 
an active foreign policy in the Western Pacific region.  Given other security concerns and 
                                                 
155 Blue-water or “open ocean”; capability is defined as the ability of naval forces to project power 
away from homeland areas for a sustained period. Littoral or “near land” consists of two areas of battle 
space: 1. Seaward-the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support 
operations ashore; 2. Landward-the area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly 
from the sea. Sean O’Keefe, Frank B. Kelso and C. E. Mundy, … FROM THE SEA: Preparing the Naval 
Service for the 21st Century, Washington D.C.: Navy Office of Information, September 1992. (accessed on 
14 September 2001); available from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt; 
Internet. 
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a chronic lack of resources, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will be able to build 
a credible Navy to support an ambitious foreign policy in the Western Pacific in the 
 
foreseeable future. 
Figure 5.1 Major Russian Naval Base Locations (From: Janes Sentinel Security 
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1. Capabilities and Limitations 
Th ussian Federation’s naval force
us weaknesses. Russian Navy today is a relic of the Soviet era in both technology 
and force structure. However, the current capabilities are diminishing and adequate plans 
are not in place to prevent a further deterioration. While many of the current weaknesses 
are a direct consequence of the USSR, other shortcomings stem directly from Soviet 
naval policies that continue to the present day. 
Overall, the Russian Navy's role is to p
t Russia's wider economic and political interests. This global security ambition is 
comprised by technology that dates from the Soviet era. Many of the ships and missiles 
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developed during the Soviet era continue to be a concern for U.S. naval forces and those 
of our allies (See Table 5.1).156 However, while the weapons still continue to pose a 
threat they are no longer cutting edge. 
 
Table 5. 1 Technologically Advanced Russian Federation Naval Ships and Missiles 
(After Ref 156)                                                  
Name Designation Mission Remarks
Project 877 Kilo 
class, Project 636 
Kilo class SS
Protection of naval bases, coastal 
installations, sea lanes and 
reconnaissance and patrol
One of the quietest diesel submarines in the 
world
Project 971 Shuka-B 
Akula class SSN USW, SUW
Quietest Russian submarine built, Similar to 
U.S. Los Angeles class, Steady production 
until 1995, However current operations 
restricted to conserve fuel
Project 949 Granit / 
Oscar I and         
Project 949A Antey / 
Oscar II SSGN Primary SUW, Secondary USW
One of Russia's largest and most capable 
submarines, designed primarily to attack 
U.S. Carrier battlegroups, Carries 24 SS-N-
19 ASM
Project 956 Sarych 
Sovremeny class DDG Primary SUW, Secondary AW
One of the last large surface combatants 
active in large numbers, Carries SS-N-22 
and SS-N-19, 11 built from 1985-1999, 
designed to complement Udaloy destroyers
Project 667 BDRM 
Dolphin Delta IV SSBN Strategic Deterrence
First launched in 1985, 1st boat of class 
ovrhauled in 1999, Of note the Pacific Fleet 
does not have any Delta IV's in service
Project 1155 Fregat I 
Udaloy-I class, and 
Project 1155.1 Fregat 
II Udaloy-II class DDG Primary USW, Secondary SUW
Udaloy-II is Russia's only multi-purpose 
warship, Carries SS-N-22, Similar to the 
Sovremennyy class it is the only other large 
surface combatant with significant numbers 
remaining in active service
Project AFM-L Alfa 
Shipwreck SS-N-19 ASM
The P-900 Alfa: Attack speed is 2.5 Mach, 
Warhead 300KG
Sunburn SS-N-22 ASM
320KG Warhead, Mach 3, Fastest ASM in 
world today
Project 1244.1 Novik 
Class SKR USW, SUW, Patrol






Reach speeds of 200 Knots underwater, 
Range 7,500 yds
156 Of note, some of the ships and weapons have been sold to other countries in the Western Pacific 
region, thereby enhancing the danger to the United States and its allies. Federation of American Scientists, 
[various papers on-line] (accessed 14 September 2001); available from http://fas.org/cgi-
bin/texis/webinator/search/?db=db1&query=russian+Navy; Internet. 
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Even before the collapse of the USSR, the Navy was in decline.157 However, 
Vladimir Putin has made a rhetorical commitment to Russia’s political resurgence based 
on a ‘first world navy.’ One of President Putin’s stated goals, described in the National 
Security Concept, is the restoration of the navy’s blue-water capability.158 In August 
2000 President Putin stated that, in his view, a strong navy would provide the key for 
Russia’s future status as a great power.  
President Putin’s stated interest in the naval forces has allowed Russia’s naval 
leadership to advance proposals for the modernization and expansion of Russia’s naval 
forces. Russians view naval power as a less threatening ‘means to an end’ for power 
projection than land or air forces. Freedom of movement, international visibility and 
operational flexibility assure lower levels risk of a conflagration that is associated with 
the Army or Air Force.159 The naval leadership is taking advantage of Putin’s vision to 
re-kindle atrophied shipbuilding efforts, a major capability during Soviet times. Also, as 
the Russian economy rebounds from the 1998 economic crisis, it is hoped that greater 
funds will be made available for defense spending. However, even with increased 
funding, it will take at least a decade to restore prestige and dominance of the Navy over 
the other services. Furthermore, at the time of writing, the world appeared on the brink of 
a global recession that must surely curtail funds available for a revival of the Russian 
Navy. 
The majority of the weaknesses of the Russian Navy stem from the geographic 
size and location of the country, as well as ingrained Soviet operating methods. Military 
leaders must implement a national defense strategy for eleven different time zones and 
four maritime areas. Therefore, the massive size of the country and population 
dis st 
demonstrated in 1985, when the Na st in the order of precedence of the 
           
tribution favors a continental orientation rather than a maritime one. This was be
vy was placed la
                                      
157 See Appendix B for force level implications. Zubkov, Radiy Anatolyevich Rear-Admiral (retired), 
“R-Adm Zubkov on State of Russian Navy,” Morskoy Sbornik, 01 January 1996, reported and translated by 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 28 March 1997, FTS19970328000664. 
158 First, a "blue-water navy" is one "designed to operate in the oceans of the world as opposed to a 
["brown-water"] navy designed to operate in coastal waters." Lew Lind, Sea Jargon: A Dictionary of the 
Unwritten Language of the Sea Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1982), p. 40. 
159 Greg Austin and Alexy D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 
New York, 2000), p. 204. 
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five Soviet armed services. 160 Not much has changed since then. Numerous problems 
that existed during the Soviet era continue today, in fact they have grown worse. The 
hazing of recruits is still prevalent.161 Naval personnel complain of serious morale 
problem
ny as 100 are still awaiting decommissioning today. Concern is growing in 
Mosco
                                                
s brought on by the lack of money and substandard military housing. Officers 
must deal with problems such as nepotism, limited promotion opportunities and a fear of 
officers at all levels of making decisions for which they will be held accountable, as well 
as long ship tours with monotonous jobs. Officers continue to fill specialists and technical 
positions that leave them little time to properly manage junior personnel.162 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Navy was unable to 
deploy many of its ships and submarines. In the early 1990’s the number of Russian ships 
declined by fifty percent and fleet aircraft by sixty-six percent. “According to a Russian 
source, in 1996 most ships were at a relatively low readiness level, with most units 
remaining close to homeport. As of 1997 it was estimated that the Navy was taking 
thirteen to fifteen ships out of commission each month.”163  By December 1998, the 
Russian Navy had removed over 150 nuclear-powered submarines from active service. 
As ma
w that the navy's present decline has become irreversible. The loss of basic 
seamanship skills due to the reduced number of ships and time at sea is only now 
becoming a topic of discussion. Sea duty for submarines has been cut twenty five percent 
since 1997, and for ships by one third. Without proper funding and maintenance the 
reduction in naval assets will only continue as ships become unseaworthy! 
Several surface ships that were under construction when the Soviet Union 
dissolved are finally reaching the fleet. However, the Navy has been forced to go, hat in 
hand, to local governments and even to businesses for alternate sources of financing. The 
 
160 The order of precedence was: (1) Strategic Rocket Forces (2) Ground Troops, (3) Troops of Air 
Defense (4) Air Force (5) Navy. Watson, Bruce and Watson Susan,  The Soviet Navy: Strengths and 
Liab
ki and Molodye. The Molodye 
wou
russia/agency/mf-intro-r.htm
ilities (Boulder: Westview, 1986), p. 20. 
161 Hazing by senior sailors (Stariki) against newly reported personnel (Molodye) exacerbate the 
problems. Upon arrival uniform exchanges would occur between the Stari
ld then be assigned to difficult and demeaning jobs formerly assigned to the Stariki, and some even 
endured physical violence. 
162 Watson, Bruce and Watson Susan,  The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities,  p. 42. 
163 Federation of American Scientists, Russian Navy, [paper on-line] (accessed 14 September 2001); 
available form http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ ; Internet. 
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shortage of funds to pay for normal repairs and upkeep, as well as inadequate port 
facilities, has meant that many ships have been taken out of service before the end of 
their prescribed life cycle. Funds are only now being allocated for the completion of ships 
ordered prior to the collapse of the USSR, as well as for refits and repairs on fleet ships 
taken out of service since.164 In 1997, the first keel lying in seven years of a major 
surface combatant occurred. However, during his 28 August 1999 press conference, 
Russian
blic relations 
fiasco if funds are not allocated for the proper disposal of radioactive equipment and 
greater
dum  radioactive waste at sea according to Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, editors 
          
 Navy Commander-in-Chief Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov announced that 
no new warships would be ordered for the Navy for the next five years. Therefore, the 
reduction in naval strength will only continue to diminish for the foreseeable future.  
2. Environmental Concerns 
Historically, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has had an abysmal 
environmental record. The Russian Navy reflects Moscow’s indifference to 
environmental concerns. The Russian Navy is only now addressing major issues such as 
radioactive waste disposal. The Navy must not only contend with the issue of maintaining 
current inventories of ships, but also the decommissioning and dismantlement of ships 
placed out of service. The monetary impact will be enormous and the Navy can ill afford 
to allocate its scarce funds for ship decommissioning/scraping. Health concerns 
emanating from the Russian Navy’s poor environmental record have been raised by 
domestic and international organizations. The issue could become a pu
 environmental damage continues to surface. 
The Russian Federation’s current policy of dumping radioactive waste into the 
world’s oceans can be traced back to Soviet practices of the late 1950s. The Soviet Union 
dumped radioactive waste into the Arctic Ocean during the initial testing of the first 
nuclear-powered submarine (Leninskiy Komsomolets). “In all, the former Soviet Union, 
now Russia, has dumped more than twice as much radioactivity as other countries having 
ped
for the Bellona Foundation.”165 One needs only to look as far as the Russian submarine 
                                       
n 1994] (accessed on 
164 For example the Admiral Lazarev from the Pacific Fleet 
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165 Dumping of radioactive waste 93 PBq/2.5MCi (official Russian figures) and 46 PBq/1.24 MCi 
(IAEA-estimate) accordingly. Nilsen, Thomas and Bohmer, Nils, Sources of Radioactive Contamination in 
Russian Counties of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, [report on-line] [Bellona Foundatio
program to find evidence for environmental concerns. Beginning in the late 1950s, the 
Soviet Union constructed approximately 250 nuclear submarines. Of these remaining, 
around 160 submarines have been decommissioned. One hundred and six of these nuclear 
submarines await dismantlement, with their radioactive reactor cores still in place. This 
leaves approximately 200 nuclear reactors on the water’s surface. Of the 106 submarines, 
the No and sixty-five still have their reactors on 
board. 
marine dismantlement, it will take up 
to a hu
                                                
rthern Fleet has mothballed ninety-two 
It should be noted that Russian Federation’s remaining 80-plus operational 
strategic and attack submarines are all scheduled to be decommissioned within the next 
ten years, thereby doubling the backlog of the “floating Chernobyl’s.” 166  
The dismantlement process is dangerous, costly and slow. Numerous concerns 
must be addressed prior to the removal of the reactor core and its components including 
the removal of missiles, torpedoes and various weapons systems. Upon the removal of 
the weapons systems, the draining and filtering of liquid radioactive wastes must occur. 
Finally, the removal and storage of the spent fuel cores and reactor compartments 
complete the process.167 A recurring theme for providing the proper technical expertise 
and material is the cost. Russia simply does not have the funds to properly and safely 
handle this enormous task. At the current rate of sub
ndred years to do away with the radioactive waste problem. Only an incurable 
optimist would assume that, during that time, a major environmental catastrophe could be 
avoided.168 
The health problems in the Arctic Ocean region provide background information 
to the overall environmental problems faced by the Russian Navy everywhere, but also in 
the Pacific. Both environmentalists and scientists claim there has been a definite decrease 
in the health quality in the Arctic region over the past fifteen to twenty years. In the 
16 September 2001); available from http://www.bellona.no/imaker?id=9845&sub=1; Internet. 
166 If a submarine were to sink, exposing its reactor fuel rods and liquid radioactive materials, the 
environmental and health hazards could be equivalent to Chernobyl. Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, and 
 
Robert Legvold, editors, Russia and the West : the 21st century security environment (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999), p. 212. 
167 “Dismantling Russia’s Nuclear Subs: New Challenges to Non-Proliferation,” Arms Control Today, 
June 1999. 
168 Russians only have the capability to dismantle 3-6 submarines a year. Alexei G. Arbatov, Russia 
and the West: the 21st century security environment, p. 211.  
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Arkhangelsk region there have been significant increases in mortality rates in cancer, and 
in blood, skin, and oncological diseases. “The Russian Academy of Medical Sciences 
recently observed that the cancer death rate in Chukotka jumped from 10% of the 
population in 1970 to 27% in 1988 writes Peter Gizweski, Research Associate for the 
Canadian Centre for Global Security. And in April 1992, scientists noted that thousands 
of seals were dying off Russia's northern coastline as a result of radioactive pollution of 
the sea
 d scended to the Amur River, and passed over the straits separating Asia and 
Americ
bed.”169 The most recent concerns have come from the fishing industries of the 
Russian Federation and neighboring countries that complain of the devastation that would 
invariably occur to the fishing industry from nuclear pollution of the seas. Therefore, now 
that Russia is a democracy, the Navy must “sell” its strategy not only to governmental 
leadership, but also from the population it is supposed to be protecting.  
 
C. THE PACIFIC FLEET 
1. History 
The importance to Russia of maintaining a naval presence in the Pacific Ocean is 
greatly underestimated by many outsiders of Russia. In the mid-eighteenth century, 
barely sixty years after crossing the Urals, Russian explorers had reached the Sea of 
Okhotsk, e
a.170 As a result, Russia acquired a permanent outlet to the Pacific Ocean before it 
did on the Baltic or Black Seas. 
The Russian Pacific Fleet was established in 1856, but was not given a high 
priority by the naval leadership. The glaring deficiencies caused through inattention were 
highlighted during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The opportunity was taken by 
commanders in the east to “unload politically active and disgruntled sailors” at the onset 
of the war. It is surprising the outcome of the war shocked many not just in Russia, but 
also in Europe due to the lack of attention for the fleet.   
                                                 
169 Peter Gizweski, Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case of Radioactivity in the 
Arc
 17 September 2001); available from http://www.carc.org/pubs/v21no4/military.htm
tic, [magazine article on-line] [Northern Perspectives, Volume 21, Number 4, Winter 1993-94] 
(accessed on ; Internet.  
170 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 
20. 
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Interest in the Russian Far East revived in the 1950’s and 1960’s when Far 
Eastern fishing fleets traveled to the open sea for the first time. Nikita Khrushchev 
viewed the Pacific Ocean as an avenue to engage the outside world. He stated his vision 
during a speech in Los Angeles when he insisted that “the Pacific Ocean unites the USSR 
and USA.”171 Khrushchev’s visions lead to the metamorphosis of the Pacific Fleet. 
During the “Era of Stagnation” (1964-1985)172 the Soviet fleet was transformed from a 
coastal “lake flotilla” of 50,000 men and 200 ships to the largest and most powerful 
component of the Soviet Navy, with 150,000 men and 800 ships operating between 
The fleet was expected to carry out a “forward 
deploy d air probes along the USSR’s Far Eastern periphery from 
bases in South Korea, Japan, Hawaii, and Alaska) against the United States (U.S.), as 
well as parry threats from China and Japan. By 1966 the Pacific Fleet was the strongest 
and largest in the Russian Navy.  
r diminished fears of confrontation in the Pacific Ocean 
region, but valid apprehensions remain. The major concerns for conflict in the Far East 
for Moscow today are, (1) potential Chinese threat, (2) war in Korea, (3) Taiwan Strait 
crisis and (4) Japanese rearmament. However, the region is no longer economically 
important to Moscow and a similar disconnect that occurred in 1904-05 can be seen 
today. By 1993, there were over 1,000 joint ventures in the Russian Pacific region with 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, North American, European, and Australian partners involving 
restaurants, department stores, hotels, boutiques, computers, sturgeon hatcheries, sausage 
plants, 
Madagascar and California.173 
ment” strategy (sea an
174 
The Russian Far east is wedged between China, Korea, Japan, and the United 
States. The end of the Cold Wa
and Dutch windmills.175 The joint ventures listed amount to little for Moscow and 
do not provide the impetus required to maintain a large fleet in a distant, backward part of 
                                                 
171 Ibid. p. 263. 
172 The “Era of Stagnation” occurred during Leonid Brezhnev’s tenure and was highlighted by falling 
rates of labor productivity, inefficiency and waste, poor quality of goods produced, poverty, etc… The 
immense hopes for sweeping changes were never fully realized in the civilian population and the Far East 
region failed to meet five-year planning targets. The failures resulted from a build-up strategic rocket, 
arm
 John J. Stephan, The Russian Far East: A History, p. 265. 
174 Ibid. p. 278 
y, navy and KGB forces, but detracted from badly needed investment in infrastructure for the region. 
Hence, the rapid expansion of naval forces in the region. 
173
175 Ibid. p. 298. 
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the Russian Federation. Of note, many territorial disputes still exist today: 1) Two small 
sections of the boundary with China remain to be settled, 2) Islands of Etorofu, 
Kunashiri, and Shikotan and the Habomai group occupied by the Soviet Union in 1945, 
now administered by Russia, claimed by Japan despite the 1997 boundary agreement and 
3) In Antarctica, Russia has asserted no territorial claims, but has reserved the right to do 
so. In the meantime, Moscow does not recognize the claims of any other nation.176 These 
disputes though apparently minor, should not be discounted and are even more 
disconcerting now to the Russian Federation due to the implied weakness of the Pacific 
Fleet d




uring the current reform process. 
2. Resources 
a. Force Structure 
(primarily surface combatants) and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski (primarily submarines). 
Economic realities and political objectives have forced an immense reduction in the 
fleet’s composition as seen in Table 5.2.  Overall, the number of ships and personnel 
has been reduced by more than half since the end of the Soviet era.  Due to force 
reductions, the 10  Eskadra has become the strongest squadron of surface vessels and 
performs a majority of the exercises.   
                                                 
176 World Fact Book, Nations/Alliances/Geographic Regions Eurasian Republics—Russia: 
Transnational Issues/Disputes [article on-line] [Periscope] (accessed on 17 September 2001); available 
from http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/eurasia/russia/worldboo/index.html; Internet. 
177 Greg Austin and Alexy D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, pp. 208-218. 
 primarily consists of Sovremennyy and Udaloi destroyers, as well as the Slava class 
cruiser  the Admiral Lazarev, a sister ship to the Variag, is currently in refit and will greatly 





Table 5.2 Changes in the Composition of Pacific Fleet Surface/Submarine/Aviation 
Forces: 1990-1998 (After Ref 177) 
The immense changes in the overall force structure have been noted. “Russia’s 
naval experts believe that the Pacific Fleet should have at least the same number of 
strategic and general-purpose submarines as it has now. According to Rear Admiral V. 
Aleksin, a senior member of the Main Naval Staff, and Captain 1st Rank (retired) E. 
Shevelev, a leading expert in systemology and the head of the military section of the 
recently-organized, International Informatization Academy. Ideally, the nucleus of the 
surface fleet should include approximately two aircraft-carriers, one to two CG (N) s, two 
to three DDGs, two to three FFGs, plus a significant number of light missile, anti-
submarine, patrol and mine-sweeping craft.”179 However, the “dream” fleet proposed is 
just that. Russia lacks the necessary resources to commit to the Far East, which is 
economically and strategically marginal. But, the force reductions should not be seen as 
solely due to economics or due to an equally large deterioration of Russian Naval Power. 
It is an attempt to rationalize a force structure that has grown unwieldy and inefficient. 
For ants and  example, in 1990 the Pacific Fleet had thirteen types of major surface combat
                                                 
179 Greg Austin and Alexy D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, p. 230. 
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12 1 Victor-III Victor-III
12 0 Whiskey
SST 1 0 Bravo
ASGSS 1 0 India
Ship Type 1990 1998 Class of Ships 1990 Class of Ships 1
Destroyers 14 11 Kashin, Kotlin, Sovremennyi, Udaloi Sovremenny, Uda
Frigates 11 3 Krivak-I, Krivak-II Krivak-I






5 0 Echo-I 
4 0 November
4 0 Victor-I
SSB 6 0 Golf-II
SSG 6 0 Juliet
SSK 13 0 Foxtrot
9 8 Kilo Kilo
SSAC 1 0 Golf 1
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twenty types of submarines, many of which performed similar tasks.180 That the ships 
were designed and delivered in this fashion was a reflection in part of the command-
based economy of the Soviet Union, which was reflected in the defense industry. Also, 
perhaps, a reflection of debates over the relative merits of ship types, or of strategies. 
Therefore, the forces reduction was an economy of force to outfit the navy with fewer 
classes of ships and submarines. However, it is clear by looking at Table 5.2 that the 
Russian Navy has paid a price for this rationalization because it now lacks the numbers to 
carryout the grand strategic vision that Putin seems to have envisioned for it in the 
Pacific. 
b. Pacific Fleet Naval Bases 
The Russian Federation, utilizing the Soviet model, employs a different 
approach for base structuring and use than the United States. In the opinion of Derek Da 
Cunha, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, the base 
structure concept is dominated by ideology rather than funding constraints. “The 
[Ru d 
hierarchical structure, from naval bases of the first rank – operationally the most 
important – to those of the fourth (rank)”.181 A base is structured on three premises: 1) 
Number and type of units normally considered home port (not transit) units at a base, 2) 
Geographical location of a base in relation to the likely area in which stationed forces 
would operate in wartime and 3) Adequacy of communication links for command and 
control of forces.182 The location of the major naval bases for the Russian Pacific Fleet 
can be seen in Figure 5.2.183  
o Petropavlovsk: can only be re-supplied by air and sea, however it 
can logistically maintain itself for 150 days. 
                                                
ssians] conceive of the value of their individual naval bases with a clearly define
• 1st Rank: Central naval command and control functions, Headquarters: 
o Vladivostok: lost some standing upon the growth of SSBNs. 
180 Ibid. p. 208. 
181 Derek Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific ( Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 57. 
 
182 Ibid. 
183 “Pacific Fleet Naval Facilities,” [chart on-line][Monterey Institute for International Studies] 
(accessed on 20 January 2001); available from, http://cns.miis.edu/db/nisprofs/maps/rfe.htm; Internet. 
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• 2nd rank: Backup command and control structures: 
o Sovetskaya Gavan (Soviet Haven) Central fleet logistics 
headquarters, connected to the Trans-Siberian railroad in 1947.  
• 3  Rank: Springboard for patrolling the Kuriles: 
o Burotan Bay.  
• 4th rank: Dispersal points during international crisis or major hostilities. 







Figure 5.2 Russian Federation Pacific Fleet Naval Bases (From: Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies)   
3. Deployments 
Deployments and the concept of Forward Presence for the Russian Navy (as was 
the case during Soviet times) are viewed as more of a political tool than a military one. 
However, the Pacific Fleet does not have the capability to accomplish Moscow’s political 
objectives. The distinction as a political tool is critical in understanding and assessing the 
capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Many people fall prey to the concept of mirror-
imaging Russian naval deployments with those of the United States. In fact the 
operational concepts of the two navies are very different. The Soviet doctrine was that of 
“Surge Deployment.” That is rapid and sudden deployment of forces out of port.184 As 
Rear Admiral John Butts stated: “To the Soviets, it’s more important to be ready to go to 
sea than to be at sea. Consequently, their readiness philosophy emphasizes maintenance 
and in-area training rather than extended at-sea operations. In-area training runs the 
gamut from ASW to cruise missile defense to basic seamanship… The goal of this 
readiness philosophy is to achieve a maximum force generation capability.” 185 Therefore 
long deployments are thought to be irrelevant to Russian ‘readiness’. However, to assert 
Moscow’s policy influence, the Russian Navy has attempted to regain a visible presence 
through the participation in international peacekeeping actions in various parts of the 
world. For instance in September 1992, a surface combatant and tanker from the Pacific 
Fleet were deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of the U.N. sanctions against Iraq.186 
Fuel shortages and a lack of maintenance have placed severe restrictions on the 
ability of the navy to undertake long-distance deployments in recent years. Those ships in 
a seagoing condition have generally been restricted to short periods of sea time in home 
waters. Senior naval officers are eager to resume “show the flag” deployments on a 
limited basis, in order to demonstrate the navy's continued ability to deploy into areas 
where Russia perceives it has strategic interests. The Russian Pacific Fleet has focused on 
short and medium range operations, due to the diminished overseas basing presence. 
Therefore, Pacific Fleet forces rely on organic resupply capabilities, with the exception of 
the few countries willing to host Russian warships. 
In February 2001, the ADMIRAL VINOGRADOV and ADMIRAL 
PANTL ent of 
Pacific Fleet surface ships in o yment displays the continued 
deterio
EYEV (Udaloi-class) along with a supply ship, undertook the first deploym
ver seven years. This deplo
ration of the Pacific Fleet in comparison to September 1992, which was not a 
                                                 
184 Ibid. p. 2. 
185 Ibid. p.  3. 
186 Forward Presence has become a primary concern for the Russian Navy and is viewed as one means 
promotes national influence and access to critical global areas, builds regional coalitions and collective 
Mike Boorda and Charles Mundy, …From the Sea, [magazine article on-line] (accessed on 17 September 
2001); available from http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/doctrine/docs/ndp1/ndp10003.htm#0003_0002
to influence events in the Western Pacific Region. Forward Presence can be defined as: “Overseas presence 




major deployment of forces. The ships deployed to the Indian Ocean for two months and 
participated in the Indian Navy's international fleet review, visited Ho Chi Minh City in 
Vietnam, conducted missile and artillery live firing drills and shadowed the USS Kitty 
Hawk prior to returning home. The goal for the Pacific Fleet deployment was to display 
its ability to conduct blue-water operations and regain its status as a ‘first world navy’, 
thereby providing it the capability to influence events in the Western Pacific region. Also, 
on September 8, 2001 an Udaloi destroyer, the ADMIRAL TRIBUTS, deployed for a 
five-day visit to Japan. Search and rescue drills are scheduled to be conducted between 
the two navies, which is only the fourth time in history that this has occurred.187 
However, it should be noted that only one warship is deploying to Japan. This suggests 
that the Pacific Fleet is incapable of doing more, or that relations between Moscow and 
Tokyo 
 stationed in the Pacific Fleet may 
ultimat
                                                
are unsteady. Currently, the Pacific Fleet is planning another deployment to the 
Indian Ocean.188  
The submarine force in the Pacific Fleet has attempted to maintain a constant 
deployment schedule. But it has also suffered from inadequate repair facilities and 
funding. Beginning in 1994, an Oscar-II class attack submarine deployment normally 
coincides with a U.S. carrier battle group deployment. However, this has not been the 
case for the SSBNs assigned to the Pacific Fleet. As of early 1998, Russia was reportedly 
deploying only two SSBNs at any one time, since 20 out of 26 were not capable of 
putting to sea at all.189 All of the current SSBNs
ely be transferred to the Northern Fleet at Nerpichy and Yagelnava due to 
inadequate shipyard facilities at Rybachi and funding, which would be in line with 
President Putin’s fiscal policy towards reform, which is undermining the policy of 
Forward Presence in the Pacific. The removal of the SSBNs would be a considerable 
 
187 “Russian Warship leaves for Japan,” [newspaper article on-line] [Russian Journal] (accessed on 17 
September 2001); available from http://www.russiajournal.com/news/index.shtml?nd=9397; Internet. 
188 The configuration and tasking of ships for this deployment has not been released. However, senior 
naval officers are eager to resume “show the flag” deployments, in order to demonstrate the Pacific Fleet’s 
ability to deploy into areas where Russia sees a strategic interest, as noted by Richard Scott, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly Naval Editor. 
189 Greg Austin and Alexy D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, p. 219. 
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blow to the Pacific Fleet and its capability to influence events in the Western Pacific 
Region.190  
Finally, one of the most professional elements of the Russian Pacific Fleet is the 
amphibious force. Pacific Fleet amphibious forces (marines) were sent to Chechnya to 
supplement the army’s forces. The live combat training received in Chechnya has only 
enhanced the capabilities and knowledge level of the force. The Pacific Fleet has 
maintained the capability to deploy a capable amphibious force of 500 marines, 20 main 
battle tanks, and 24 infantry fighting vehicles anywhere in the Western Pacific region.191 
However, the fact that troops were sent to Chechnya demonstrates that when push com  
to shove, the Pacific Fleet transfers its resources to more important priorities. 
4. Exercises 
Since 1998, the Pacific Fleet has maintained the ability to test its ships and 
personnel, albe  a
es
it t a greatly reduced level compared to the Soviet era. Fiscal constraints 
placed on the fleet require many of the exercises to be conducted in the Sea of Okhotsk, 
Sea of Japan and Bering Sea to conserve fuel and rations. The primary focus of the fleet 
has shifted from Soviet concerns as a blue-water naval force for power projection 
operations to peacekeeping operations, piracy prevention and sea lines of communication 
(SLOC) protection. Russian Pacific Fleet submarines continue to perform missions of 
limited patrols for strategic deterrence, protection of strategic assets, regional security, 
and training for anti-surface warfare. However, the patrols are constantly decreasing in 
frequency and it is believed that gaps between SSBN patrols are increasing in frequency 
for the Pacific Fleet. Various exercises have occurred in the 1990/2000s and are listed 
below: 
                                                 
190  SSBNs carry long-range nuclear warheads and their primary mission is nuclear deterrence. In 
1991, Russia had 6 SSBN bases, 6 SLBM storage and loading bases, several weapon depots, the total of 22 
strategic naval facilities. The SSBN infrastructure will be reduced due to the costs associated with 
operations and the diminished military budget. However, if START II is ratified, than over half of the 
strategic weapons in the Russian Federation may reside on SSBN’s. The inherent strategic value of  the 




ional Security. Without this credible threat the Russian Pacific Fleet will have a difficult time 
influencing events in the Western Pacific Region. “Submarine Centennial Frequently Asked Questions,”  
[article on-line] [Chief of Naval Information] (accessed on 17 September 2001); available 
://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/submarines/centennial/faqs.html; Internet. And, “Chapter 3. 
The Russian Federation's Strategic Nuclear Forces: Present Status and Prospective Developments,” [article 
on-line] [Nuclear Arms Reduction: The Process and Problems] (accessed on 17 September 2001); available 
form http://www.armscontrol.ru/reductions/ch3.htm#fn25; Internet.  
191 Greg Austin and Alexy D. Muraviev, The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia, p. 224. 
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• Beginning in 1994, an annual disaster relief exercise has been conducted 
with the U.S. Navy. The stated goal is to ease regional tensions and 
the Pacific 
• It should be noted Russian submarines on exercises are operating in a 
fashion very similar to the Soviet era by carrying out simulated attacks on 
U.S. naval forces.  
• From 29-30 August 2001, Pacific Fleet surface ships, submarines and 
promote awareness while also providing valuable peacekeeping training. 
• “In April 1996, sbor-pokhod (exercise designation) of the Pacific Fleet 
became the largest naval exercise held in Russia or the USSR for ten 
years. The manoeuvres held over several days in areas of the Sea of Japan, 
Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, involved 69 warships and support 
vessels, and paratroopers and aviation of the Far East MD. Some 200 
different exercise components were conducted.”192 
• In 1997, six of the eleven sbor-pokhod’s conducted were in 
Fleet. 
• In October 1999 Russian and Chinese navies conducted their first joint 
naval exercise since 1949. Russian warships included the Pacific Fleet 
flagship Variag and destroyer Burgy. The two Russian vessels participated 
in joint exercises with warships from China's Eastern Fleet.193 
• From March to June of 1999 three command and staff exercises were 
conducted. 
194
aircraft took part in an exercise in the Gulf of Peter the Great. The goal 
was to prepare the crews of the ocean going ships for combat missions. 
                                                 
192 Ibid. p.  225. 
193 Federation of American Scientists, Pacific Fleet, [Article on-line] (accessed on 17 September 
2001); available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/mf-pacific.htm; Internet. 
194 “Russia’s Navy looks to show the flag again,”  [article on-line] [Jane’s Defence Weekly 10 April 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that current attempts by the Russian Federation to assert its 
influence in the Western Pacific region through naval power are destined to fail for four 
reasons: First, historically Russia has prov n unable to sustain a naval build-up. The 
country’s political, economic and social structure is too fragile to mount a sustained naval 
armaments program. Also, Russia is a continental power that lacks the resources and 
interests for sustained maritime power proje tion. Second, Russia’s major interests lie in 
Europe. Historically, when forced to choose between its European and its Pacific 
interests, Russia invariably chooses Europe. his was the case in the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-1905, and in the two World Wars. Even today, Moscow’s primary security 
concerns are NATO rom Central Asia. 
Expansion in the Western Pacific will do nothing to resolve either issue. Third, the 
Russian Federation has limited common interests with the countries of the Western 
Pacific region beyond a residual anti-Americanism. China’s sense of isolation is being 
exploited by Moscow as a vehicle to assert strategic leverage regarding the United States. 
Fundamentally, Moscow shares few common interests with the PRC beyond the common 
fear of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. Taiwan, the issue presented by Beijing as 
its most important priority, has no fundamental interest for Moscow. Fourth, arms sales 
provided Moscow with only short-term leverage in the projection of international 
influence. Current advantages in the areas of naval technology held by the Russian 
Federation will diminish as the systems sold to India and the PRC are reverse engineered, 
and new systems are introduced.  
The Russian Navy is too decrepit to support an aggressive diplomacy strategy in 
the Pacific. The Russian Federation inherited an immense industrial complex, as well as a 
capable and powerful naval force in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. However, the end of the 
Cold War has witnessed the diminished power of many of the institutions of the former 
Soviet Union. Among them, the under-funded Russian Navy is but a shadow of its Soviet 
predecessor. The leadership of the Russian Federation under President Vladimir Putin is 
nevertheless eager to utilize its navy as leverage to extend its influence in the Western 
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the Russian Federation seeks t port visits, participation in 
peacekeeping and multilateral operations, and through joint maneuvers with other 
countri
r the death of its champion Admiral 
Gorshk
o increase its visibility through 
es such as India, Vietnam and China. Third, the sale of high technology naval 
weapons systems, specifically the Sovremennyy class guided missile destroyers, Krivak-
class frigates and Kilo-class submarines, gives it a prominence in the region. Finally, 
naval power can be employed to leverage better relations and possible alliances with U.S. 
adversaries in the region to counter a dominant U.S. influence. Increasing tensions 
between the PRC and the United States in the Western Pacific over Taiwan and the South 
China Sea have presented Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opportunity to make 
common cause with the Chinese government to thwart U.S. power. However, none of 
these aspirations is close to being realized due to a lack of means. 
Russia’s leaders have attempted to increase their country’s world profile through 
naval expansion on several occasions. As a consequence, the rise and fall of the Russian 
Navy is an old story in Russian history that has occurred on at least three previous 
occasions. After its founding in 1697 by Peter the Great, the navy was instrumental in the 
successes at Azov and against the Swedes. But Peter’s successors failed to carry on his 
vision, and the navy ultimately declined to that of a second-rate power. The Russian 
Navy did rise in prominence once more at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and it 
was perceived as the world’s third most powerful behind that of Great Britain and France. 
However, much of the navy was annihilated by Japan at the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. 
Finally, the Soviet naval build-up spearheaded by Admiral Sergei Gorshkov in the 1970s 
and 1980s appeared to place the Russian Navy on par with that of the United States 
Navy. Once again, the navy fell into decline afte
ov. The three pivotal periods in the history of Russian naval development 
addressed provide the background required for understanding the successes and failures 
of the Russian Navy since Peter the Great. However, the periods of Russian naval 
primacy have been fleeting for four reasons: First, Russia has a limited number of outlets 
to the world’s seas. Furthermore, the outlets Russia possesses are poorly situated because 
of their strategic vulnerability or geographic remoteness. Second, Russia possesses 
insufficient resources to be both a land and sea power. When push comes to shove, the 
Russian Army will always receive the lion’s share of resources ahead of the navy. Third, 
90 
the political stability required to sustain the build-up of a powerful navy has eluded 
Russia. Finally, Russia’s interests are primarily European. Prior attempts to increase 
naval presence in the Western Pacific region have invariably failed over time. 
Serious military reform for Russia has languished since Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
minimalist attempts during ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’. This thesis has utilized Russian 
specialist Jacob Kipp’s definition of military reform as an “all-embracing process which 
encompasses all the military and paramilitary formations of the Russian state and 
addresses the core political, economic, and social questions attached to raising, 
sustaining, training, arming, deploying, and employing a military as an element of 
Russian national power.”195 Kipp’s definition implies that military reform for Russia is a 
two-part process: First, Russian governments since 1985 have had to overcome the Soviet 
legacy 
                                                
of a militarized state, society and economy, while shifting control of the military 
to civilians. Second, they have had to reestablish the foundation for a ‘new’ military that 
meets today’s state, society and economic needs. Initially, President Putin has embarked 
on strategy of force reduction similar to that followed by President Yeltsin. While one 
can only speculate as to the reform measures he will enact in the future, the reality is that 
reform measures in the Russian Federation have only amounted to further cuts for 
military forces and embraced only modest organizational changes. Low pay and poor 
discipline continue to diminish the effectiveness of the forces. The draft is a major 
problem and violence still occurs in the ranks. Roughly seventy percent of defense 
spending today is for personnel and maintenance. Therefore, the numerous attempts at 
reform in the Russian Navy have failed and will continue to fail because they have not 
been properly implemented and because most have been undertaken in a disorganized 
and haphazard manner. 
Russian power projection into the Far East will be stillborn because Moscow has 
little to offer countries in the region. The loss of Cam Ranh Bay, the only remaining 
overseas naval presence of a once great fleet, highlights the Russian Federation’s decline, 
mocking President Putin’s insistence that the Western Pacific region will be a primary 
195 Jacob Kipp, Russian Military Reform: Status and Prospects (Views of a Western Military 
Historian) [Paper on-line] (Sveaborg, Finland: Finnish National Defence College, 1998, accessed 15 
August 2001); available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/agency/rusrform.htm; Internet. 
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focus of Russian diplomacy. Events in Europe and Central Asia have deflected these 
priorities in the Far East. However, China has recognized the Russian Federation’s 
current weakness and desires a limited amount of diplomatic and military cooperation. 
But, th
rd Presence. Current deployments and exercises are few and far 
betwee
                                                
e primary reason for Russia to support China’s security interests and vice versa 
may lie in the fact that each country now views the other as a strategic back up. Russian 
leaders have often stated that the threats to Russia are NATO enlargement to the East and 
radical Islamic forces in Chechnya not the Far East. Hence, the only real common 
interests shared between the two countries are a fear of Islamic Fundamentalism and a 
reduction in the perceived U.S. hegemony. 
Conditions in the Navy in general, and in the Pacific Fleet in particular have gone 
from bad to worse. On 31 December 1991, the Russian Federation was officially 
established as an independent state. On 7 May 1992, President Boris Yeltsin announced 
the creation of the Russian armed forces. Since 1992, the Russian Navy has suffered from 
under funding more than any other branch of the armed services. This under funding has 
diminished the capabilities, increased the limitations and reduced the environmental 
concerns of the Russian Navy. Hence, the Navy has concentrated its focus on a littoral or 
coastal defense vice a blue-water force.196 The reduction in the Navy will only diminish 
the ability for the Russian Federation to influence events in the Western Pacific region 
and the capabilities of the Pacific Fleet have been reduced to those of a piecemeal naval 
force. It should be noted many of the ships that were decommissioned had outlived 
recommended life cycles. A few modern vessels are being commissioned, but at an 
extremely slow rate. The reduction in size severely limits two of the primary measures 
for the Pacific Fleet to influence affairs in the Western Pacific region: SSBN 
deployments and Forwa
n. The Pacific Fleet does not have sufficient capabilities to support an active 
foreign policy in the Western Pacific region.  Given other security concerns and a lack of 
resources, it is unlikely that the Russian Federation will be able to build a Navy to 
support an ambitious foreign policy in the Western Pacific in the foreseeable future.  
 
196 Sean O’Keefe, Frank B. Kelso and C. E. Mundy, … FROM THE SEA: Preparing the Naval 
Service for the 21st Century, Washington D.C.: Navy Office of Information, September 1992. (accessed on 
14 September 2001); available from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt; 
Internet. 
92 
The United States is uniquely positioned to influence, through naval forward 
presence, the Western Pacific region. The region has a complex geographical, economic 
and political environment, which will be difficult for any country to manage. It offers 
blue-water and littoral environments in which the U.S. Navy has learned to operate 
effectively. Also, primary U.S. trade occurs within the region, in particular with Japan 
and an increasingly economically powerful China. The changing political situation in the 
region is important to the U.S. Navy. President Putin appears determined to make the 
Russian Federation a prominent actor in the region through the assertion of Russian naval 







ce. However, an absence of fundamental Russian interests in the Western Pacific 
combined with the inadequacy of Russian naval power means that Russian attempts to 









































APPENDIX A: TIMELINE FOR NOTEWORTHY EVENTS IN 





Y e a D a y E v e n t
1 9 6 2 C u b a n  M is s ile  C r is is ,  K ru s c h e v  w ith d ra w s  m is s ile s  f ro m  C u b a .
1 9 6 4
L e o n id  B re z h n e v  h e lp  e n g in e e r  K ru s c h e v 's  fa ll f r o m  p o w e r ,  b e c o m e  f ir s t  s e c re ta ry  o f  
C o m m u n is t  P a r ty .
1 9 6 9 M a jo r  b o rd e r  c la s h e s  w ith  C h in a .
1 9 7 2
D é te n te :  P re s id e n t  R ic h a rd  N ix o n  v is its  U S S R , s ig n s  a rm s  c o n tro l t r e a t ie s  w ith  C h a irm a n  
B re z h n e v .
1 9 7 8 -1 9 8 2 S o v ie ts  in v a d e  A fg h a n is ta n
1 9 8 5 -1 9 9 1
G e n e ra l S e c re ta ry  M ik h a il G o rb a c h e v  a t te m p ts  to  im p ro v e  fa lte r in g  e c o n o m y  w ith  g la s n o s t  
a n d  p e re s tro ik a .
1 9 9 1
S o v ie t  U n io n  d is in te g ra te s ;  1 4  fo rm e r  re p u b lic s  b e c o m e  in d e p e n d e n t n a t io n s .  R u s s ia n  
F e d e ra t io n  fo rm e d ; B o r is  Y e lts in  a p p o in te d ,  la te r  e le c te d  p re s id e n t .
1 6 -J u n
S t il l a  m e m b e r  o f  th e  U S S R , th e  R u s s ia n  R e p u b lic  e le c ts  B o r is  Y e lts in  p re s id e n t  in  its  f ir s t -
e v e r  d ire c t  e le c t io n s .
1 9 -A u g
A  h a rd - lin e  c o m m u n is t  c o u p  a t te m p ts  to  d e p o s e  S o v ie t  P re s id e n t  M ik h a il G o rb a c h e v .  
Y e lts in  p la y s  a  c ru c ia l ro le  in  re tu rn in g  h im  to  p o w e r  tw o  d a y s  la te r ,  e a rn in g  b ro a d  p o p u la r  
s u p p o r t  in  th e  p ro c e s s .
2 5 -D e c
G o rb a c h e v  re s ig n s  h is  p o s it io n  a s  p re s id e n t  o f  th e  U S S R , s ig n ify in g  th e  d e m is e  o f  th e  
S o v ie t  U n io n .  T h e  fo rm e r  s o v ie t  re p u b lic s  ( in c lu d in g  R u s s ia )  b e c o m e  in d e p e n d e n t s ta te s .
1 9 9 2
Y e lts in  e n d s  s u p re m a c y  o f  C o m m u n is t  P a r ty ,  p r iv a t iz e s  s ta te - ru n  e n te rp r is e s ,  g u a ra n te e s  
f re e  p re s s ;  b u s in e s s m e n , m o b s te rs  b e g in  to  ta k e  o v e r  e c o n o m y , m a s s iv e  c o r ru p t io n  s e ts  in .
J u n e
Y e lts in  n a m e s  Y e g o r  G a id a r  a c t in g  p r im e  m in is te r  o f  R u s s ia .  G a id a r  is  n e v e r  c o n f irm e d  b y  
p a r lia m e n t.
1 4 -D e c
In  th e  fa c e  o f  p a r lia m e n ta ry  o p p o s it io n  to  G a id a r 's  re fo rm s , Y e lts in  f ir e s  h im  a n d  a p p o in ts  
b u s in e s s m a n  V ik to r  C h e rn o m y rd in  p r im e  m in is te r .
1 9 9 3 1 2 -D e c
A  n a t io n a l re fe re n d u m  a p p ro v e s  a  n e w  R u s s ia n  c o n s t itu t io n ,  w h ic h  in c re a s e s  th e  p o w e r  o f  
th e  p re s id e n t .  N a t io n a lis ts  a re  w e ll- re p re s e n te d  in  th e  n e w ly  e le c te d  D u m a  ( th e  lo w e r  h o u s e  
o f  p a r lia m e n t) .
1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 6
te d ,  w ith d ra w s  w ith  h e a v y  
c a s u a lt ie s .
1 9 9 6 3 -J u l
D e s p ite  s u f fe r in g  a  h e a r t  a t ta c k  in  J u n e ,  Y e lts in  w in s  a  s e c o n d  te rm  in  o f f ic e ,  d e fe a t in g  
c o m m u n is t  G e n n a d y  Z y u g a n o v  b y  1 3  p o in ts  in  th e  n a t io n a l e le c t io n .
1 9 9 8 R u s s ia n  s to c k  m a rk e t  c ra s h e s ,  e c o n o m y  c o lla p s e s .
2 3 -M a r
Y e lts in  s a c k s  h is  e n t ire  c a b in e t ,  in c lu d in g  C h e rn o m y rd in .  H e  n a m e s  lib e ra l fo rm e r  E n e rg y  
M in is te r  S e rg e i K ir iy e n k o  a c t in g  p r im e  m in is te r .  T h e  D u m a  tw ic e  re je c ts  K ir iy e n k o 's  
n o m in a t io n ,  b u t  c o n f irm s  h im , u n d e r  th e  th re a t  o f  d is s o lu t io n ,  in  a  th ird  v o te .
2 3 -A u g
In  th e  m id s t  o f  R u s s ia 's  w o rs t  p o s t-S o v ie t  c u r re n c y  c r is e s ,  Y e lts in  f ir e s  K ir iy e n k o  a n d  re -
n o m in a te s  C h e rn o m y rd in  P r im e  M in is te r .  T h e  D u m a  tw ic e  re je c ts  h is  n o m in a t io n .  R a th e r  
th a n  r is k  a  th ird  v o te  9 a n d  th e  p o s s ib le  d is s o lu t io n  o f  th e  D u m a 0 , Y e lts in  n o m in a te s  
Y e v g e n y  P r im a k o v ,  fo re ig n  m in is te r  a n d  fo rm e r  K G B  o f f ic ia l,  a s  a  c o m p ro m is e  c a n d id a te .  
T h e  D u m a  c o n f irm s  th e  re la t iv e ly  c o n s e rv a t iv e  P r im a k o v  in  S e p te m b e r .
1 9 9 9 1 2 -M a y
Y e lts in  f ir e s  P r im a k o v ,  o s te n s ib ly  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  n e e d  fo r  m o re  e n e rg e t ic  le a d e rs h ip .  T h e  
n o m in a t io n  o f  In te r io r  M in is te r  S e g e i S te p a s h in ,  a  Y e lts in  lo y a lis t ,  a s  P r im a k o v 's  
re p la c e m e n t s u g g e s ts  to  m a n y  th a t  P r im a k o v  h a d  b e c o m e  to o  p o w e r fu l fo r  th e  P re s id e n t 's  
c o m fo r t .  S te p a s h in  is  e a s ily  c o n f irm e d  b y  th e  D u m a .
1 5 -M a y T h e  D u m a  v o te s  d o w n  f iv e  c o u n ts  o f  im p e a c h m e n t b ro u g h t a g a in s t  Y e lts in .
9 -A u g
S te p a s h in  is  f ir e d  w ith o u t  e x p la n a t io n .  Y e lts in  n o m in a te s  V la d im ir  P u t in ,  fo rm e r  K G B  o f f ic ia l,  
h e a d  o  th e  F S B  a n d  s e c re ta ry  o f  th e  R u s s ia n  S e c u r ity  C o u n c il.  Y e lts in  a ls o  d e s ig n a te s  
P u t in  h e ir -a p p a re n t  to  th e  p re s id e n c y .
1 9 -D e c S c h e d u le d  d a te  fo r  D u m a  e le c t io n s
1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0 S e c o n d  C h e c h e n  w a r ,  R u s s ia  c ru s h e s  re b e ls ;  V la d im ir  P u t in  e le c te d  p re s id e n t
2 0 0 0
R u s s ia n  O r th o d o x  C h u rc h  b e s to w s  s a in th o o d  o n  C z a r  N ic h o la s  a n d  1 ,0 0 0  o th e rs  k il le d  b y  
C o m m u n is ts .
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APPENDIX B:  SOVIET/RUSSIAN FEDERATION PERSONNEL 












1989 1992 1995 2000
Personnel 450,000   440,000 270,000 180,000 
Strategic SSN's 62            58          39          30*
General purpose nuclear and diesel 
powered submarines 372          227        115        61          
Subma  (total) 434          285        154        91          
Ocean urface ships: air-capable, 
cruiser troyers, large ASW, 2nd 
rank patrol, large landing 193          142        109        75          
Sea zone surface ships: small missile, 
3rd ran ol, small ASW, ocean 
minesw epers, medium landing 342          304        238        84          
Combatant ships (total) 969          731        501        159        
Small c mbatants 776          566        245        189        
Combatant ships and
combatants (total) 1,745       1,297     746        348**
Missile-armed aircraft 378          328        158        134        
Bombers 202          715        170        71          
Attack aircraft, fighters, ASW aircraft 207          195        121        98          
Strike aircraft (total) 787          1,238     449        205        
Reconnaissance, target designation, 
EW aircraft 152          101        70          55          
Combat aircraft (total) 939          1,339     519        358        
Combat helicopters 385          343        321        222        
Aircraft and helicopters--training and 
transport 493          435        325        220        
Aircraft and helicopters--(total) 1,917       2,117     1,165     800        
Shore troops 24,000     42,000   27,000   25,000   
* Only 19 are operational
Number as of:
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